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Abstract 
 
 My dissertation is comprised of three separate essays that investigate health and 
welfare issues, both in China and US. The first essay provides insights into the net 
effects of increasing women’s bargaining power on the health outcomes of their 
children. Using Chinese longitudinal data in the 1990s, I find evidence in favor of 
women’s empowerment: children in families where the mother was head of 
household or made more purchasing decision had better Body Mass Index (BMI) 
than their counterparts whose mother had less power. The second essay explores the 
health consequences of computer use in internet cafés compared with usage at home 
only or in both settings. Using Chinese longitudinal data in the mid 2000s, I find 
suggestive evidence that adolescents and youth using computers in internet cafés are 
more likely to smoke and to self-report poor health status, and to consume a higher 
share of fat in their daily diets. The health disparities between computer users in 
internet cafés and other settings are significant. The third essay examines changing 
levels of Unemployment Insurance (UI) eligibility and benefits receipt among 
low-educated single mothers who entered unemployment between 1990 and 2005, 
and changing participation in cash welfare and the Food Stamp Program (FSP). 
Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the study shows that 
low-educated single mothers who enter unemployment experience an increase in UI 
eligibility but not an increase in UI benefits receipt, when compared to low-educated, 
single, childless women who enter unemployment. The proportion of this population 
accessing benefits from at least one of these programs remains similar across the 
study period. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
My dissertation is comprised of three separate essays that investigate health and 
welfare issues. Each essay makes use of micro-level datasets to identify benefits and 
problems with broad interests.  
 Chapter 2 is the first paper which is titled “Family Bargaining, Women’s Power 
and Its Impact on Child Health in China.” Using Chinese longitudinal data, this paper 
provides insights into the net effects of increasing women’s bargaining power on the 
health outcomes of their children. Although prior studies find some evidence that 
gendered differences in intra-household bargaining power over household resource 
allocation affect children’s well-being, many of them operationalize differential 
bargaining power in terms of discrepant spousal attributes such as differences in age, 
education, earned income, unearned income, and inheritance. I contribute to the literature 
both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, I apply a collective model of household 
behavior to examine the effects of an increase in mother’s bargaining power on child 
quality. Empirically, I construct two unique measurements: mother as head of the 
household, and mother as the decision-maker in purchasing household durable. There is a 
potential problem of endogeneity here. Health outcomes could be both causes and 
consequences of various explanatory variables. To deal with this potential endogeneity, I 
explore one source of exogenous variation as an instrument for the women’s power 
variables. The instrument is whether local cadres are given economic rewards to 
implement family planning policy. There are two channels through which this cadre 
evaluation system can affect women’s power at home. On the one hand, the one-child 
policy causes a large divergence between the ideal number of children and the actual 
number of children, which make husbands increasingly reliant on their wives as source of 
old-age support due to wives’ specialization in household production. On the 
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other hand, the greater desire for offspring by husbands motivates them to compromise 
on household issues in order to obtain cooperation from wives in the fertility decision and 
in failing to comply with the one-child policy. Using the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS) data in the 1990s, I find evidence in favor of women’s empowerment: 
children in families where the mother was head of household or made more purchasing 
decision had better Body Mass Index (BMI) than their counterparts whose mother had 
less power.  
Chapter 3 is the second paper which is titled “Computer and Internet Café Usage: 
A Study of Their Adverse Health Effect on Chinese Adolescent and Youth”. This chapter 
investigates the health consequences of computer use in internet cafés compared with 
usage at home only or in both settings. As computer access has become easier in China, 
questions have been asked about its implications for the health of adolescents and youths. 
Although computer use may generate similar health consequences as other screen-based 
sedentary activities such as television watching by displacing physical activity and 
increasing calorie consumption, computer use may also impact health in more 
complicated ways, including exposure to unhealthy online information about violence 
and pornography; negative peer effects in internet cafés; and lack of sleep due to 
overindulgence in computer games and chat rooms. Using longitudinal data from the 
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) in the mid 2000s, I find suggestive evidence 
that adolescents and youth using computers in internet cafés are more likely to smoke and 
to self-report poor health status, and to consume a higher share of fat in their daily diets. 
The health disparities between computer users in internet cafés and other settings are 
significant. 
Chapter 4 is the third paper which is titled “Unemployment Insurance and Low-
Educated, Single, Working Mothers before and after Welfare Reform” and co-authored 
with Luke Shaefer. Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation, this study 
examines changing levels of Unemployment Insurance (UI) eligibility and benefits 
receipt among low-educated single mothers who entered unemployment between 1990 
and 2005. It also examines changing participation in cash welfare and the Food Stamp 
Program (FSP). Data from 1990-94 and 2001-5 show that low-educated single mothers 
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who enter unemployment experience an increase in UI eligibility but not an increase in 
UI benefits receipt, when compared to low-educated, single, childless women who enter 
unemployment. Because of declining cash assistance receipt during 2001-5, UI becomes 
a more common income support for this population than cash assistance. Further, the 
probability of accessing the FSP increases among low-educated, single mothers who 
enter unemployment in 2001-5. As a result, the proportion of this population accessing 
benefits from at least one of these programs remains similar across the study period. 
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Chapter 2 
Family Bargaining, Women’s Power and Its Impact on Child Health in China 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper examines the net effect of raising mothers’ bargaining power over 
household resource allocation on children’s health in China. 
There is no issue of male-female bargaining power if the household is viewed as a 
single decision-maker. However, the literature generally rejects the unitary model of 
household decision-making (Thomas 1990, 1994; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Browning 
and Chiappori 1998). Alternatively, bargaining theory pioneered by Manser and Brown 
(1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), and collective models by Chiappori (1988, 
1992) consider individual preferences inside the households, and intra-household 
distribution of resources. A number of studies have found that women’s empowerment 
has positive effects on household resource allocation, especially in terms of benefiting 
their children. I provide a detailed discussion of this line of literature in section 2.  
I contribute to the existing literature both theoretically and empirically. In theory, 
I apply a collective model of household behavior to find out the association between 
women’s power and child quality. The model generates some clear theoretical 
predictions. If mother has positive reservation utility, measured by her headship status or 
her active participation in the purchasing process of durable goods, raising mother’s 
power will increase child quality. 
Empirically, I use the instrumental variable approach to deal with the potential 
endogeneity of women’s power measurements. There are at least three sources of 
endogeneity in the relationship between mother’s power and child outcomes. One is the 
maternal heterogeneity (or ability bias). If the mother having high socio-economic status 
tends to be more powerful in family bargaining, she more likely invests in her preferred 
family affairs such as child human capital. Although some observable characteristics can 
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be controlled in the regression, estimates are still biased with unobservable 
characteristics. For instance, high ability women can bring more resources to the 
marriage through a high level of social capital and extensive social networks, which may 
simultaneously enhance their power and their capacities to invest more on children in 
ways unobservable by econometricians. This case would lead to an overestimate of the 
impact of mothers’ power on child outcomes. The second concern is the heterogeneity in 
the quality of children. Women having high quality children tend to gain more respect 
from husband and parent in-laws, and therefore to have more voice in family issues. In 
this case, the reverse causality is a threat to consistency. The third concern involves social 
norms or custom-based gender discrimination. In societies with patrilocal marriage and 
patrilineal kinship and inheritance, women are limited to the domestic sphere and have 
less bargaining power. In the meantime, these regions tend to have stronger preferences 
for sons and to allocate more resources to sons. In this situation, mother’s power 
measurement would be negatively correlated with child outcomes, and the ordinal least 
squares (OLS) estimates will have negative signs and be underestimated. All these 
selection dynamics may cause the OLS estimate to be biased and inconsistent. Therefore, 
the central task for the empirical study is to identify sources of women’s power which 
vary exogenously. That is, I need an instrument which is strongly correlated with 
women’s bargaining power within the family but not with their decision to invest in child 
health.   
I explore one source of exogenous variation as an instrument for the women’s 
power variables. The instrument is whether local cadres are given economic rewards to 
implement family planning policy. There are at least two reasons that this incentive 
scheme can affect women’s power at home. On the one hand, the one-child policy causes 
a large divergence between the ideal number of children and the actual number of 
children, which makes husbands reliant primarily on wives as old-age support due to 
wives’ specialization in household production. On the other hand, the greater desire for 
offspring by husbands motivates them to compromise on household issues in order to 
obtain cooperation from wife in the fertility decision and in failing to comply with the 
one-child policy. 
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I use two measurements to proxy for women’s power: women as head of 
household and women as decision-makers in purchasing household durable goods. Using 
the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data in the 1990s, I find supportive 
evidence in favor of women’s empowerment: children in families where the mother had 
more control over household resources had better Body Mass Index (BMI).  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
literature review. Section 3 provides the background information of China’s one-child 
policy and the instrumental variable. Section 4 is the theoretical framework. Section 5 
describes the data, measurement, and summary statistics. Section 6 presents the empirical 
strategy and results. Section 7 conducts robustness check. Section 8 concludes and makes 
policy implications.  
 
2.2 Related Literature 
This paper relates to three branches of the development economics literature. 
First, it is related to the literature testing intra-household resource allocation, and 
household consumption and production decisions in general. Second, it is related to the 
empowerment-development literature that specifically examines spousal cooperation, 
women’s bargaining power, and its impact on children’s outcome. Third, it is related to 
literature on population policies that dramatically change fertility, child bearing and 
family dynamics. 
2.2.1 Intra-household resource allocation model  
 The literature has established four types of models regarding intra-household 
resource allocation: the unitary model (or common preference model); the collective 
household model; the cooperative bargaining model; and the non-cooperative model. The 
unitary model, which assumes all members of the household have identical and 
homothetic utility functions, and the household acts as a single unit, has been widely 
rejected empirically in both developed and developing countries (Behrman 1997; 
Haddad, Hoddinott & Alderman 1997).  
             The most common testable hypotheses associated with this model are to predict 
that exogenous sources of income such as non-labor income should be spent in the same 
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manner regardless of which spouse receives it, and it should affect labor supply similarly 
regardless of who receives it. For example, Schultz (1990) uses data from Thailand to test 
whether unearned income affects wife and husband differently. He finds strong evidence 
that the unearned income of women affects their labor supply, but finds that this 
association doesn’t exist for men. Thomas also (1990) rejects the common preference 
model using survey data on family health and nutrition in Brazil, finding that the 
maternal income effect is much bigger on these five child health outcomes: calorie and 
protein intakes, child survival rate, and anthropometric indicators. Quisumbing and 
Maluccio (2003) similarly suggest that the unitary household model is not a good 
approximation of household behavior. By using assets at marriage as indicators of 
bargaining power and applying a single methodological framework to four countries with 
diverse social and economic conditions, they find that more assets brought to the 
marriage by women relative to men increase education expenditure shares in Bangladesh 
and South Africa, while in Ethiopia it is men’s relative asset value that increases the 
expenditure shares on education.  
The remaining three models have attempted to disaggregate the household utility 
function, and incorporate the heterogeneous preferences of individual family members 
into household allocation decisions. The collective model, proposed by Chiappori (1988; 
1992), assumes that household allocations obey a Pareto-efficient sharing rule, and the 
household utility function can be represented by a linear combination of all members’ 
utility functions. The weight in front of each member’s utility function reflects his/her 
relative power in the household.  The cooperative bargaining model, developed by 
Manser and Brown (1980), and McElroy and Horney (1981), assumes that couples pool 
their incomes, allocate them jointly, and share pure public goods. They solve a Nash 
bargaining problem in which couples’ threat points are their respective utilities for 
dissolving the marriage. However, some authors have suggested that divorce may not be 
the appropriate threat point (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). The non-cooperative model 
assumes that households do not pool their income, and that each individual makes 
consumption and production decisions based on his own labor and non-labor resources.  
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The testable prediction from these three models is whether a Pareto efficient 
outcome is attained in the household. Empirical evidence is mixed. Using French data, 
Bourguignon et al (1993) find results that marginal propensities to consume out of total 
income are the same across goods, which consolidates the prediction that a Pareto 
efficient consumption outcome can be obtained. In contrast, Udry’s finding (1996) is 
inconsistent with Pareto efficiency. By using agricultural data from Burkina Faso, he 
discovers that the crop yields vary between wives’ plots and husbands’ plots, and a 
reallocation of labor and fertilizer from husbands’ plots to wives’  plots can increase the 
total output. Thus, evidence is inconclusive regarding the issue whether households attain 
Pareto efficient outcomes. If many households currently stay in the situation of non-
Pareto efficient outcomes, policies promoting Pareto improvements will enhance family 
welfare.  
2.2.2 Development-empowerment relationship and its impact on child human 
capital  
 The gender gap is persistent in the home, in the labor market and in a number of 
domains around the world. Many factors contribute to this gender inequality, such as 
poverty, segregation, and discriminative social norms. It has been widely recognized that 
developmental policies toward improving women’s earning capacity and expanding 
women’s opportunity can reduce their unequal treatment in the household. Since women 
are primary caregivers of children, their higher decision power will translate into better 
child outcomes. Many studies of development policies have found evidence to support 
this. Qian (2008) investigates the effect of post-Mao agricultural reform on the number of 
missing women and survival rate for children in China. She looks into tea production 
regions where women have a comparative advantage over men in the production of tea 
due to the smaller stature of tea trees, and finds that an increase in this sex-specific 
female income can translate into an increase in the survival rate for girls while increasing 
the relative income of males worsens the survival rate for girls. Impact evaluations of 
conditional cash transfer programs such as Mexican government’s successful 
PROGRESA, provide even stronger evidence. Schultz (2001) finds that PROGRESA 
9 
 
educational grants offered to poor mothers in rural Mexico can increase the school 
enrollment rates for their children in grades three through nine.  
A bulk of literature on the Old Age Pension (OAP) program in South Africa has 
shown that children living in extended families benefit from the pensions received by 
their grandmothers. Case and Deaton (1998) highlight the behavior effects of pension 
income and state that female-headed households spend substantially less on alcohol and 
tobacco. Duflo (2000) evaluates the effect of pension transfers on children’s nutritional 
status and finds that the height-for-age z-scores of younger girls are increased by 1.16 
standard deviation, and the weight-for-height z-scores by 1.19 standard deviation. The 
effect is not significant for boys, suggesting that pension income received by 
grandmothers eventually leads to better nutrition for girls. Hamoudi and Thomas’s 
analysis of South Africa’s pension income (2005) is consistent with the previous findings 
that the gender of pension recipients and the gender of the child play a role in terms of 
measuring the size of effects. All these creative studies on OAP are based on the 
assumption that pension has no impact on the unmeasured characteristics of children who 
reside with their grandmothers.  We should accept this assumption only with great 
caution, since children’s nutrition intake tends to be systematically different between 
pension eligible and non-eligible households.  
A direct command of extra resources caused by policy changes is not the only 
channel to increase women’s power in the household. Rangel (2006) has found evidence 
that a shift in property rights can affect outcomes for children even when not altering the 
total amount of household resources. Using a legal change in alimony rights in Brazil as a 
proxy for an exogenous redistribution of family bargaining power in favor of women, he 
discovers that women’s higher decision power affects the level of investment in 
schooling of children, particularly for older girls.  
Although direct control of monetary resources can contribute to a rise in 
bargaining power, desirable characteristics such as higher education can also increase 
women’s power at home, which eventually benefits their children. Thomas et al (1991) 
find that maternal education can raise Brazilian children’s height by increasing mothers’ 
access to information, measured by indicators of reading newspapers, watching TV and 
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listening to the radio. Using household survey data from the United States, Brazil, and 
Ghana, Thomas (1994) discovers that the impact of parental education on child height is 
dependent on the gender of parent and the gender of child. The bigger effect of maternal 
education on daughter’s height is explained by the technological differences in child 
rearing and parental differences in gender preference. Using Brazilian data, Lam and 
Duryea (1999) also find strong effects of women’s schooling on children’s schooling and 
survival rate. All these findings suggest that policies targeted towards women can 
generate immediate consequences, either causing an increased decision-making role for 
women in the household or causing an improvement in child human capital. There is 
strong evidence that women tend to shift greater shares of household expenditure toward 
children if they are able to control a bigger share of household resources. 
We should bear in mind that these findings are not intended to deny men’s 
positive roles in the family. Actually, Edmonds (2004) finds that adolescents aged 13 to 
17 are more likely to enroll in school when they live with a pension eligible man than an 
eligible woman in South Africa. 
2.2.3 Population policies, fertility and child outcome  
The third strand of literature is related to population policies that change fertility 
and family dynamics. Under the pressure of resource constraints and attempts to 
implement sustainable development, many developing countries have highlighted the 
integration of population policy with development policy in the past decades, and 
population control has been perceived as an effective way of improving average human 
capital, especially in populous countries such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
and Bangladesh. There are two types of policy interventions in family planning aimed at 
benefiting women and their families. One is voluntary population policy, which uses 
incentives and opportunities to influence individual decisions about the timing and 
quantity of child birth. Most conditional transfer programs work in this way. In 
Bangladesh, a conditional cash transfer program is in place for girls contingent on their 
enrolling in secondary school and not getting married before the legal age of eighteen. In 
Mexico, the anti-poverty program PROGRESA combines cash transfers with financial 
incentives that encourage families to invest in children’s health and education. Poor 
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mothers in rural marginalized areas are eligible to receive cash transfers if they 
participate in growth monitoring and nutrition supplements programs; attend education 
programs about health and hygiene; enroll their children in schools; and obtain 
recommended vaccinations for family members. Similar incentive-based welfare 
programs like PROGRESA are being implemented in other Latin America countries. 
Since such conditional transfer programs increase the amount of resources women can 
manipulate, they will change the power structure within the household and subsequently 
affect child human capital.  
The other type of population policy is China’s one-child policy which adopts a 
birth quota to control population growth. Since China is a traditionally patriarchal society 
with a strong preference toward male children, such a mandatory policy may have 
differential effects across individuals and disproportionately affect less-educated rural 
couples who heavily rely on sons for old-age support. I will have a thorough discussion 
of the implementation of the one-child policy in next section.  
 
2.3 Background 
In this section, I provide some background information about China’s one-child 
policy and discuss reasons why the cadre evaluation system is a valid instrumental 
variable for women’s power measurement.  
 China’s one-child policy stands out as the strictest and the largest social 
experiment in the world thus far. The one-child policy was formally started in 1979, and 
has since affected the lives of every Chinese household. The policy initially stipulated 
that each couple could have only one child except under special circumstances such as 
one or both of the couple are minorities; both spouses are single children; spouses engage 
in dangerous industries such as mining; or a first-born child is handicapped. Under these 
rules, women are given birth quotas, and households are penalized for above-quota births. 
Local cadres (including village cadres) are given economic incentives to enforce the 
policy in order to meet the goal of reducing the fertility rate. This nationwide campaign 
was accompanied by a large-scaled sex-selective abortion, sterilization, and female infant 
abandonment in the early 1980s (Greenhalgh 1985). To curb these negative social 
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consequences, the central government amended the policy in 1984 under the name 
“Document 7”. This produced two changes. First, rural couples were now allowed to 
have a second birth if the first child is a girl. Second, family planning responsibility was 
decentralized from the central to local governments, allowing for regional variation in the 
strictness of family planning policies.  I use the regional and temporal variation in local 
cadres’ implementation of family planning responsibility systems as an instrument for 
measuring women’s power. I will discuss shortly how this implementation system acts as 
a force to modify women’s power in the family.  
The family planning responsibility system is operated at all levels of 
governments. The central government sets population targets and directions; the State 
Family Planning Commission, a bureaucratic division of the central government, is 
responsible for translating it into doable policies and guidelines, and communicates them 
to their counterparts at the provincial levels. Local family planning cadres are probably 
the most important level of bureaucracy involved with the day-to-day implementation of 
these policies. Local cadres, hired at the county, township or village level, work closely 
with local residents, and can adjust implementation according to local conditions within 
birth control quotas set by the upper administration. A strict cadre evaluation system is in 
place, which assesses local cadres by their performance and ability to meet quotas on a 
regular basis, and their job tenure, promotion and salaries are all related to their 
performance outcome. At the operational level, they adapt a variety of policy 
enforcement methods according to local conditions. These methods range from moral 
persuasion; provision of certain conceptive methods (such as Norplant or IUDs); and 
follow-up reproductive health services to women to the use of more coercive methods 
such as heavy fines, female sterilization, and forced abortion for couples with 
unauthorized births. Recently, the one-child policy has been implemented with less 
coercive methods and couples are provided with financial rewards if they are willing to 
stop at one child. Such policy adjustments may be caused by a shift in social norms so 
that rural couples now accept smaller families. They may also be by-products of the one-
child policy such as dwindling numbers of children, huge old-age dependency ratios, and 
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imbalanced male-female sex ratios, along with other negative social impacts such as 
rising crime (Edlund et al 2007).  
I use the cadre evaluation system as an instrument for women’s decision power in 
the household. There are at least two channels through which this policy instrument can 
modify family dynamics. First, the cadre evaluation system does not take into account the 
availability of formal old-age support in particular regions, and the large divergence 
between the ideal number of children and the actual number of children may cause men 
to increasingly rely on their spouses as primary caregivers for old age. The pension 
system only operates for the urban population, and rural couples largely rely on children, 
especially sons, for old-age support. If local cadres are given large economic incentives 
to implement birth control, they may promote more oppressive contraceptive methods 
such as forced abortion and female sterilization in order to meet the goal. As a 
consequence of stricter enforcement, couples will have fewer numbers of children. The 
discrepancy between the ideal and actual number of children may alter traditional old-age 
support patterns, causing husbands to recognize the necessity of using wives as old-age 
support due to women’s specialization in household production. The forced adjustment in 
old age support plays a positive role to increase women’s decision-making power in the 
household.  
Second, the greater desire for offspring by husbands motivates them to 
compromise on household issues in order to obtain cooperation from wife in the fertility 
decision and in failing to comply with the one-child policy. The literature has provided 
some evidence that there is significant difference in fertility preferences between 
husbands and wives. Using household data from the Malaysia Family Life Survey, Rasul 
(2008) finds that, among Malays and Chinese couples, husbands desire significantly more 
children than their wives. This disagreement on fertility preferences is largely driven by 
husbands’ desire for more sons. The CHNS dataset doesn’t ask questions related to 
couples’ fertility preferences, and I can not test the degree of conflict over fertility 
preferences within Chinese couples. However, since patriarchal attitudes are also rooted 
in Chinese society, it is very likely that husbands desire more sons than wives, and that 
non-compliance with one-child policy is greater within these families.   
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There are large variations across the country regarding the ease of implementing 
birth control policy. In those areas with stronger preferences for male children and for 
larger families, local cadres will confront greater resistance and disobedience from 
couples. Therefore, they have to be remunerated by upper administration to enforce the 
policy. Table 3 shows that neighborhoods with cadre evaluation system in place are 
systematically different than neighborhoods without that policy. On average, 
neighborhoods implementing the policy have 15 percent more residents and are 16 
kilometers more distant from the provincial capital than neighborhoods without 
implementing the policy. In addition, those areas are characterized by relatively poorer 
development indicators: female unskilled workers earn less; roads in the neighborhood 
are less likely to be paved; and primary schools and middle schools are more distant from 
the neighborhood. There is no significant difference between wages of male unskilled 
workers in these two areas. Since wives’ decisions for fertility and collaboration for 
compliance with the birth policy is so crucial for families living in those remote populous 
areas, husbands have to make concessions on family issues and behave in more 
cooperative manner.  
My identification assumption is that conditional on family and individual 
characteristics, this cadre evaluation system is unlikely to directly affect children human 
capital except through its effects on their mothers’ intra-household bargaining power.  
 
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
2.4.1 Set-up and first order conditions 
This section presents a collective household model to assess the effect of mothers’ 
bargaining power on child quality in general. Women’s bargaining position in the 
household is determined by her reservation utility and her preference for child quality.  
Consider one household with two working-age parents and one child, with each 
parent caring about his/her private consumption, leisure, as well as their child’s quality.  
Child quality is a household public good and producing child quality involves some costs.  
To simplify the model, I make two assumptions. First, there is no tradeoff between child 
quality and quantity. The utility from multiple children is simply the duplication of utility 
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from one child. This assumption is less strict in the Chinese context since couples are 
subject to fertility regulations caused by the one-child policy. Second, the individual 
utility function is separable between the child quality and the private goods that involve 
consumption and leisure. According to Chiappori and Ekeland (1999), when there is a 
public good, identification can be achieved under the separability hypothesis.  
Let the utility Ui of each parent i (where i=f, m denoting father and mother 
respectively) be a function of own consumption goods Ci, own leisure li, and child quality 
Q. Specifically, the utility function for each parent i is separable in private goods (Ci, li) 
and child quality Q as below:  
QlCQlCUU iiiiiii logloglog),,(         (1) 
where αi is parent i’s preference for own leisure relative to own consumption; βi is parent 
i’s preference for child quality relative to own consumption. It is worth mentioning that 
parental preference αm and αf may differ between mother and father. The two parents 
jointly consume the public good Q. The prices of mother’s composite good and father’s 
composite good are denoted as pm and pf, respectively.  The child quality Q can not be 
purchased directly from the market, but is produced by some convex cost function c(Q) 
with increasing marginal cost. That is, both the first order derivative and the second order 
derivative of c(Q) are positive: cq>0 and cqq>0.  
In a collective model of household, I characterize the constrained programming 
problem by maximizing father’s own utility subject to mother’s utility no less than some 
positive reservation value, and budget constraint. The optimal choice for variables (Cf*, 
Cm*, lf*, lm*, Q*) is the solution of the following maximization problem:  
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where mU is mother’s reservation utility. The total household monetary spending should 
be no more than total wage earnings Y and non-labor income M. Y comes from two 
parents’ wage earnings. wm is mother’s wage rate, and wf is father’s wage rate. Hm is 
mother’s labor supply, and Hf is father’s labor supply. In case of one parent not working, 
wm or wf is their respective shadow wage. Each parent has time endowment 1, split 
between working and caring for child. After setting up the Lagrangian function, I get the 
following First Order Conditions (F.O.C.s) that can be employed in the identification of 
the parameters of interest (see proofs in Appendix).  
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2.4.2 Applying the Implicit Function Theorem 
My goal is to obtain the effect of mother’s bargaining power MU on child quality 
Q, namely, the sign of 
mU
Q


. The implicit function theorem is the ideal tool to be 
employed in identifying the relationship between the variable Q and the parameter MU . 
According to the first order condition for the child quality Q, I define the function F(.): 
QcCpCpUQFDefine qmmmfffm  ),(  
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After taking derivatives over Q and MU , respectively, I obtain the following equation 
indicating the effect of mother’s bargaining power on the child quality(see proof in 
Appendix); namely 
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The above condition suggests that an increase in mother’s reservation utility can increase 
the child quality if the mother’s reservation utility is positive, and the mother’s preference 
for the child quality is stronger than the father’s (βm>βf). Since I use the value of 
reservation utility to represent mother’s bargaining position in the household resource 
allocation, the above discussion directly leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1 Suppose the cost function of the child quality is twice differentiable and 
the marginal cost is increasing; and the mother’s reservation utility is positive. Then, in 
equilibrium, if mother cares more about the child than father does, an increase in 
mother’s bargaining power in the household will increase the child quality.   
 
This piece of theoretical prediction regarding the relationship between bargaining 
power and child quality puts forward the importance of raising mother’s power in the 
household domain. This is particularly relevant in the developing world where there is 
persistent gender discrimination in the household and patriarchal attitudes value the 
social status of men over women. There are at least two ways to increase mothers’ 
reservation utility value. One is directly related to mothers’ earning capacity, including 
channels to increase their wage rate, working hours or opportunities to participate in 
employment-related activities, or opportunities to obtain non-labor incomes from 
transfers (empowering them with the right to inheritance or welfare receipts). The other is 
related to distributional factors which don’t affect the household budget set but influence 
the intra-household decision process substantially. These factors can include spouses’ 
relative attributes in educational attainment, health status, occupation, and other 
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socioeconomic indicators. The following empirical analysis provides evidence that, when 
mothers have positive reservation utility, an increase in mothers’ power will increase 
child quality.  
It is worth mentioning that the above proposition only holds when the mother’s 
reservation utility is positive. When her reservation utility equals zero, no conclusion can 
be reached. The possibility is that the mother is entirely powerless in the household, and 
the husband has absolute power to decide child quality. In this case, child quality is 
completely determined by husband’s characteristics and wife plays no role in determining 
child quality. In the appendix, I provide some evidence that, when the mother has zero 
reservation utility (measured by her non-participation in the purchasing decision), her 
attributes are unrelated to child quality.  
 
2.5 Data, Measurements and Summary Statistics 
2.5.1 Data and Measurements 
The empirical analysis is based on longitudinal household survey data from the 
1991 and 1993 waves of Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), administered by 
the Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Although the 
most recent CHNS dataset is wave 2006, the questions about home-asset decision-makers 
were no longer included in surveys after 1997. Therefore, I only use two earlier waves of 
data in my study. By using a multistage random cluster process, this survey draws its 
sample of approximately 4400 household with 16000 individuals each wave from eight 
provinces in China, including two rich eastern coastal provinces, four middle-income 
provinces and two poor inland provinces. The survey expands to nine provinces since the 
wave of 2000. Within each province, the provincial city, one low-income city and four 
rural sites are randomly selected with a total number of 24 communities. The survey 
includes a wide range of information on health, nutrition, and daily activity for each 
person residing in the household. In particular, it records fertility and marital history for 
each married women, which allows me to control household characteristics. The 
restricted community-level dataset provides useful information on the demographic and 
economic conditions of each community, ranging from commodity price, infrastructure, 
19 
 
revenues and expenditures, family planning, and policy implementation. I have gained 
full access to this restricted dataset after fulfilling the requirements of the data 
administrative center.  
I focus on the nutrition and health status of children aged 2-15 years old. Since 
my definition of women’s power is reflected in her bargaining with her spouse, I only 
include those children with both parents’ information available in the survey. The Body 
Mass Index (BMI), calculated by the ratio of weight over the square of height (km/m
2
), is 
used as the dependent variable. I adopt it for two reasons. First, the literature has well 
documented that the BMI, an anthropometric indicator, can serve a good proxy for the 
short-run nutritional status of children, both low BMI and high BMI serving as early 
indicators of future health problems and later productivity (Sen 1990; Strauss and 
Thomas 1998; Fogel 1998). Second, the BMI is less vulnerable to measurement error 
than other well-being indicators since its calculation is only based on two simple 
measures: height and weight. Based on the BMI, I also create two dichotomous variables, 
namely underweight and overweight, with a value of 1 indicating a bad health outcome. 
Since children have different growth pattern than adults, I adopt the age-gender specific 
cutoff values created by Cole et al (2000, 2007) (see Table A3), who use six international 
surveys from Brazil, Great Britain, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Singapore, and the 
United States to generate an internationally comparable prevalence rates of thinness and 
fatness in children and adolescents. I drop those outliers with a BMI value less than 10 or 
more than 50. 
The key variable of interest is women’s power status at home. I create two 
measurements. One is an indicator of mother’s headship in the household, and the other is 
an indicator of mother as the decision-maker for purchasing household durable goods. 
The CHNS’s definition of household head is consistent with the standard definition of 
headship in China.  Head is recognized as the household member who plays a decisive 
role in family issues, either the major economic provider or owner of the house, and is 
listed in the hukou register. The hukou system, or Chinese household registration system, 
divides Chinese citizens into urban residents and rural residents. This urban-rural divide 
outlines an individual’s rights to entitlements with a rural hukou linked with a plot of 
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farmland and a site for building own house while a urban hukou linked with much more 
favorable welfare such as subsidized housing, public education, pension insurance, 
employment and work safeguard. Since its inception in 1958 as a developmental policy 
targeting heavy industrialization, the hukou system has transformed Chinese society 
dramatically and been increasingly recognized as a barrier to further development. Each 
household is distributed with one hukou register booklet which lists information of all 
relevant household members with one as head of household. The CHNS sample shows 
that 6.5 percent of children live in mother-headed household. By taking account for the 
possibility that enumerators mistakenly assign wife as head of household simply because 
husband was not at home during the interview time, I checked whether wives switched 
their headship status between two waves. I find that 96.5 percent of women held the same 
type of headship in both waves; only 1.4 percent of women, totally 26 women, switched 
from head to non-head from 1991 to 1993. Therefore, the misclassification of headship is 
not an issue in my study.  
The second power measure is based on women’s role in purchasing household 
durable goods. The survey contains questions such as “who in your household decided to 
buy this item?” There are twelve total items in the list, including radio/ tape recorder, 
VCR, black-white TV, color TV, washing machine, refrigerator, big wall clock, 
microwave oven, sewing machine, electric fan, camera, electric rice cooker, and pressure 
cooker. It can be seen that telephone and computer was not even included in the list at 
that time. As for the types of decision-makers, the survey includes four categories: 
husband decides, wife decides, husband and wife jointly decide, and other members 
decide. I create a composite index to proxy women’s decision power in two steps. In the 
first step, for each women living in household j and owning asset k (k=1,2,…12), I create 
a categorical variable WOMENROLEjk as defined below: 
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The value 0.5 is obtained by taking the expectation of 0 and 1. When couples claim that 
they make joint decision, we can not observe the underlying decision making process. It 
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may be 50-50, or 90-10 or 20-80 split, so on and so forth. I can only impose strong 
assumption that the joint decision is equivalent to 50-50 split.   
In the second step, I construct a continuous variable WOMENSHAREj as the 
weighted average share of total household asset values which women decide to buy. See 
below:  
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For instance, given that household j only owns four assets: color TV, fridge, washing 
machine, and camera with each asset valued at 3000, 1800, 450, 580 respectively, the 
couple make a joint decision on the purchase of TV and fridge while the woman alone 
decides to buy the washing machine and husband alone decides to buy the camera, the 
wife’s share would be calculated as following: 
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Her share equals .489 implying that she makes decision to buy 48.9 percent of total assets 
in her household, and her husband makes decision on the remaining 51.1 percent. I 
calculate this share for each household. Figure 1 presents the distribution of womenshare 
variable with a range of 0-1. As is shown in the histogram, nearly 45 percent of 
households make the purchasing decision jointly. Women in 22 percent of households are 
completely powerless and their husbands behave as a dictator. In the remaining 
households where women have at least some positive decision power, men are more 
powerful in nearly 21.6 percent of households and women are more powerful only in 11.3 
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percent of households out of the sample. The graph is heavily left skewed indicating that 
husbands still dominate the decision making process in the household and wives have 
less power in general.  
 Based on the distribution of womenshare variable, I create a dichotomous variable 
womenmorepower to be used in the estimation equation.  
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 I make two sample restrictions. First, since the theoretical prediction only holds 
when the mother has some positive reservation utility, I exclude those households with 
men behaving as a dictator and women being completely powerless (womenshare equals 
to 0). Second, I exclude those households with couples making joint decisions. The final 
sample only includes households in which men make more decisions (womenshare is less 
than 0.5) or women make more decisions (womenshare is greater than 0.5). 
 Figure 2 and Table 1 describe the composition of household durable goods. I 
divide the entire set of goods into four types: clothing production and maintenance; food 
preparation and storage; non-entertainment electric goods and entertainment electric 
goods. The clothing production and maintenance category includes two goods: sewing 
machine and washing machines. Here, wives make the highest share of decisions: 22% 
and 16%, respectively. The food preparation and storage category includes three goods: 
refrigerators, electric rice cookers and pressure cookers. Here, wives make the second 
highest share of decisions. The non-entertainment category includes electric fans and big 
wall clocks; and the entertainment category includes color TVs, black/white TVs, 
radio/tape recorders, VCRs and cameras. Here, wives are least likely to make purchasing 
decisions, and the decision share is only about 6 percent. Table 1 provides additional 
information about the goods composition. It can be seen that in the early 1990s, camera 
and VCR belong to luxury goods and the majority of the households don’t own them.  
Three sets of variables are used as predictors of women’s power in the first stage 
regression of IV estimation, or as predictors of child health outcome in the IV-2SLS 
regression. The first set of variables are child characteristics-age and gender. The second 
set of variables measure mothers’ individual attributes relative to those of fathers, 
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including whether the mother is better educated; whether the mother currently works 
while the father does not; whether mother is official cadre while father not, whether 
mother is minority while father not, whether the mother self-reports health as excellent or 
good while the father does not; whether the mother does household chores while the 
father does not; and whether the mother has lower wage than the father. Since a large 
fraction of women’s wage information is missing, I replace those missing values as zero. 
In the meantime, I create a dummy variable with 1 indicating those women with missing 
wage information, and 0 for others. By doing so, I am able to include more observations 
into the analysis. The father-mother age difference and their respective BMI values are 
included as measurements of parental endowed attributes. These relative characteristics 
of mothers may reflect her comparative advantages in the spousal relationship. The third 
set of variables are household-level characteristics, including parents’ marital status, 
residency location, total number of own children in the household, household size, living 
arrangement with parent-in-laws and household gross income. The Appendix Table A2 
explains these measurements in detail.  
2.5.2 Descriptive statistics about mother’s headship (headship) 
 It is a mystery why women are head of household when men are present in the 
household. What predicts women’s decision power in the household? Table 2a describes 
summary statistics about characteristics of children and their parents by the type of 
headship. Female-headed households account for 5.2 percent of total sample. Children 
living in mother- headed households tend to have higher BMI value, and to be a little bit 
older. Their mothers’ relative attributes differ sharply between these two types of 
households. Female heads seem to be more able than their spouses. In female headed 
households, women tend to have higher socioeconomic status as shown by better 
educational attainment; more active participation in the labor market; greater likelihood 
of holding an official position; more time spent on household chores; less likelihood of 
being a minority. In terms of household characteristics, female heads have higher 
household gross income and smaller family size; are more likely to live in urban sites; 
and are less likely to co-reside with parent-in-laws. Unlike the living arrangements in the 
United States where the number female-headed household is almost equivalent to the 
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number of unmarried single women households, the majority of female heads in China 
are married (95 percent in this sample). These results imply that women with relatively 
higher socioeconomic status are more likely to take the role of headship in China.  One 
thing worth mentioning here is that female headship is more likely in cases where wives 
are younger than their husbands, which is in contrast with the typical impression that 
older husbands play a dominant role in the household affairs.  
2.5.3 Descriptive statistics about mother as decision-maker (womenmorepower) 
 Table 2b summarizes the characteristics of children and their parents according to 
mothers’ decision-making power. Out of 1054 observations, 34.2 percent of children live 
in households with mother having more purchasing power.  Children in these cases tend 
to have higher BMI value. Their mothers are more likely to have a formal job, do 
housework, and be healthier. They live in smaller households with fewer children, and 
less likely to live with parents in-laws. These characteristics are more or less similar to 
those obtained from the headship sample. One big difference is that households in which 
women have more power tend to be poorer. The possible reason is that women have more 
power in purchasing those low-valued goods such as sewing machine, and much less 
power in purchasing those high-valued goods such as color TV. The households owning 
low-valued goods are generally poorer than their counterparts owning high-valued goods.  
 
2.6 Estimation Strategy and results 
If mother’s power measurement is randomly assigned across households, we 
could use OLS to estimate the following specification:  
ijtijtijtijt XtrMotherpowehChildhealt   210                                   (9) 
where Childhealthijt is an outcome for child i in household j at time t (t=0,1). I will run 
three separate regressions with these three different dependent variables, namely the 
logarithm of BMI, underweight, or overweight. Motherpowerijt is the key variable of 
interest for the mother of child i in household j at time t, represented by two 
measurements- Headship or Womenmorepower. My main focus is on the estimate of α1 
and I expect α1>0. Xijt includes all three sets of controls: children’s age and gender, their 
mothers’ relative attributes in comparison to those of fathers’, and household-level 
25 
 
characteristics. εijt captures the idiosyncratic errors. However, mother’s power status is 
unlikely to be randomly assigned and selection on observables or unobservables is 
possible. Therefore, the coefficient on Motherpower, α1 need not represent the causal 
impact of mother’s power on child outcome variables. I need to isolate a source of 
variation in mother’s power that is exogenous with respect to child outcomes. The 
instrumental variable I adopt is the local cadre evaluation system: whether local cadres 
are given economic awards to implement family planning policy. I hypothesize that 
households living in communities with cadre evaluation system in place will see an 
increase in women’s power at the domestic sphere.  
The first stage regression equation can simply be written as below: 
ijtijtjtijt XCadrerMotherpowe   10                                                    (10) 
where Cadrejt is an indicator whether the local community adopts the cadre evaluation 
system. The predicted value of Motherpower from the first stage, PredMotherpower is 
used in the second stage regression:  
 ijtijtijtijt XweredMotherpohChildhealt   Pr10                                    (11) 
To be a good instrument, the Cadre variable only affects the child outcome variable via 
the endogenous Motherpower variable, and not through any other channels. In the section 
of Robustness Check, I provide some evidence against potential violations of this 
exclusion restriction.  
2.6.1 Health Consequences of Mother Being Head (IV) 
The first stage estimates are presented in Table 4a. As expected, women living in 
places where local cadres are given economic rewards to implement family planning 
policy have a higher probability of being heads of household. The coefficient on the 
cadre variable without adding controls is .013 and statistically significant. The coefficient 
is increased to .019 after adding controls, and it remains statistically significant. It is 
always mysterious what predicts women’s headship in a family when the couple co-
reside. The estimated coefficients provide some suggestive evidence on factors 
contributing to headship. First, a wife who has higher socioeconomic status (SES) than 
husband is more likely to be head of household. These SES indicators include better 
educational attainment, holding an official position, not being a minority, and doing more 
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housework. This doesn’t imply that females in female-headed households are more able 
than those in male headed households: It simply indicates that female heads tend to be 
more able than their spouses. Household-level factors such as being married, living in 
urban sites and not living with parents-in-laws all increase women’s likelihood of 
becoming head of household.  
Table 4b presents the second stage IV estimates. I list OLS and IV results by pairs 
for convenience of comparison.  In my preferred specification (Column 2,4,6), the IV 
estimates indicate that children whose mothers are head of household enjoy higher BMI 
and a higher probability of becoming overweight, and these two coefficient estimates are 
both statistically significant. The IV coefficient estimate is not statistically significantly 
different from zero in the underweight regression. Among the coefficient estimates of all 
covariates, the estimates on both parents’ BMI are big and statistically significant, 
presenting strong evidence of intergenerational similarity in terms of weight status and 
underlying diet habits. Consistent with the literature, household income has a significant 
effect on child nutrition status. The Hausman test for endogeneity (F-statistic) clearly 
indicates that OLS estimates are inconsistent for my model.   
2.6.2 Health Consequences of Mother Being Decision-maker (IV) 
For the endogenous decision-maker variable, the first stage estimates are 
presented in Table 5a. Consistent with findings derived from the headship sample, 
women living in areas with cadre evaluation system in place tend to have a higher 
probability of making decisions in purchasing household durable goods. The coefficient 
on the cadre variable is .061 without controls and .087 with controls, both being 
statistically significant. Again, in contrast with the usual impression that older husbands 
tend to dominate family issues, the evidence here shows that wives with older husbands 
have more decision power. Although coefficient estimates on other covariates are not 
statistically significant, most of them have the expected sign. Living in a large household 
has a negative and statistically significant impact on women’s decision power.   
To analyze the effect of women’s decision-making status on their children’s 
health, I regress the three health outcomes on the power measurement, respectively. 
Table 5b presents both OLS and IV regression estimates. As in the first stage regressions, 
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I control for provincial fixed effects, time trend and a vector of control variables in all 
regressions. The IV estimates is positive and statistically significantly different from zero 
only in the BMI equation. The IV estimates in both overweight and underweight 
equations are not statistically different from zero.  
Overall, the findings from these two power measurements are consistent. Children 
in families where their mothers have more control over household resources have better 
BMI.  
 
2.7 Robustness Checks 
In this section, I present several different pieces of evidence to verify the 
empirical validity of my findings.  
2.7.1 Composition of household goods 
As discussed above, women’s decision making status varies a lot among different 
types of household durable goods. Women tend to make more decisions when purchasing 
low-valued goods, and make fewer decisions when buying high-valued goods. I divide 
the twelve goods in the sample into two broad categories: female-type goods vs. male-
type goods. The female-type goods are those goods closely related to housework 
production, including sewing machine, washing machine, refrigerator, electric rice 
cooker and pressure cooker. In contrast, the male-type goods are those goods mainly for 
entertainment and non-essential usage, including color TV, black/white TV, radio/tape 
recorder, VCR, camera, electric fan and big wall clock. Panel A of Table 6 presents the 
estimation results. Despite the fact that women make more purchasing decisions in 
female-type goods, raising their power does not necessarily have an effect on their 
children’s quality. Instead, it is when women make more buying decision in male-type 
goods that it contributes to their children’s nutrition status.  
2.7.2 Decision-making status measured by the total number of goods (non-
monetary) 
The variable womenmorepower is constructed by using information about 
women’s decision role and the monetary value of each household goods. The empirical 
work reveals the relevance of pecuniary value and decision power. One possible concern 
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is whether the quantity of household goods plays a role in the decision power equation. 
Based on the womenrole variable, I construct an index: 



N
i
iwomenrole
N
itywomenquant
1
1
, indicating the fraction of total number of household 
goods women make decision. This index is irrelevant to monetary value of goods. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant (Table 6, Panel B), 
which highlights the relative importance of quality over quantity in defining women’s 
decision power.  
2.7.3 Sample selection issues 
The current sample includes all children aged 2-15 years old in both urban and 
rural areas. The immediate concern is whether the empirical findings hold for subsamples 
such as urban vs. rural, girls vs. boys, one-child families vs. multiple-child families.  
First, empirical studies have found that the one-child policy is stricter in urban 
sites than in rural sites (Zhang and Spencer 1992). Violation of birth quotas in cities can 
cause a lost in promotions or bonuses, or even a job. Thus, the higher degree of 
compliance with the one-child policy in cities makes the work of family planning cadres 
easier. In sharp contrast, villagers are not employed by any formal work units and their 
compliance with one child policy is closely associated with the strictness of the policy 
implementation. Lack of pension systems for old-age support and stronger preferences 
for sons makes many rural couples have above-quota births. The CHNS sample shows 
that more than 45 percent of urban households have only one child while the ratio is only 
14 percent among rural households. I perform the same estimations using the rural and 
urban subsamples separately. Panel A of Table 7 documents the results. The IV 
coefficient for logarithm of BMI in the rural sample is large but statistically insignificant 
while the analogous IV coefficient in the urban sample is positive and statistically 
significant.  
Second, separate estimations are performed among female and male child 
subsamples. Panel B of Table 7 shows that the estimates for girls are strong and 
statistically significant while they are insignificant for boys. Moreover, the results that 
mother’s power status may affect girls more than boys are consistent with existing 
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literature that it matters who controls and receives the household resources (Thomas 
1994).  
Third, I conduct separate estimation for one-child families versus multiple-child 
families. Compared with children without siblings, children with siblings tend to have 
better nutrition status (Panel C, Table 7). This doesn’t say that children in single-child 
families are not well fed by their mothers. Instead, this result may reflect that in one-child 
families, the child is pickier about food and has easier access to a wider range of snacks.  
2.7.4 Inclusions of community-level variables 
 Although the inclusion of provincial fixed effects as well as a wide range of 
control variables in the regression can account for observable heterogeneity, the 
community-level heterogeneity could still affect the major findings. For instance, the 
level of local economic development may affect both the adoption of the cadre evaluation 
system and child health. In general, the economic rewards to cadres are paid out of local 
revenues. If wealthier communities are more likely to reward cadres for their 
implementation of family planning policy, and wealthier households spend more on their 
children, then the estimated impact of mother’s power on child health will be biased 
upwards. To inspect the extent to which local economic situations might bias the results, I 
include two additional controls in the regression. One is average per capita income, and 
the other is an indicator of having electricity power cutoff at least one day per week. 
These two variables capture the overall income and infrastructure advancement at the 
local level. It turns out the coefficients on these two controls are very small and 
statistically insignificant, and the coefficient on women’s power measurements remain 
the same. (In order to save space, results are not reported here.) 
 
2.8 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 This paper develops and tests a simple model of household bargaining to address 
the association between women’s decision power and child outcome.  The model 
generates a clear theoretical prediction that, when the mother has stronger preference 
over child quality than the father does and mother’s reservation utility value is positive, 
an increase in mother’s bargaining power can benefit the child. I test the model using 
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household data from China going back to early 1990s. The empirical evidence is 
consistent with the theory: women who are heads of household or the primary decision-
makers in purchasing household durable goods tend to have children with better body 
mass index.  
 From the theoretical perspective, the model in this paper underlines the 
importance of jointly using parental preferences for child quality and reservation utility as 
a proxy for mother’s decision position in the household.  The empirical work reveals that 
the types of decisions matter. First, it is the quality of household goods rather than the 
quantity that contributes to women’s greater power status and children’s better nutrition 
status. Women making more purchasing decisions over those high-valued goods are more 
likely to spend in ways that benefit their children. Second, total monetary value rather 
than the total number of household goods matters for the child quality.  
 Both theoretical predictions and empirical findings emphasize the importance of 
raising mothers’ power in the household domain. This is particularly relevant for 
developing countries where there is persistent gender inequality in households. Two types 
of policy interventions are feasible. One is related to a direct impact on women’s earning 
capacity: an increase in wage rate, an expansion in employment opportunities, or a boost 
in receiving non-labor income through inheritance or welfare transfer. The other is to 
increase women’s human capital stock, which can modify the distributional process in the 
household in favor of children while maintaining the household budget unchanged.  
 The last thing worth mentioning is that my findings come from a sample where 
couples have unequal power over household resources- either husbands enjoy more 
power or wives enjoy more power. The model can not predict the child’s wellbeing in a 
framework where spouses cooperate and have equal power.  
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Women Decision Power Measurement 
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Three Types of Household Decision Making  
in Durable Goods Purchases 
Panel A: Clothing Production and Maintenance 
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Panel D: Entertainment Electronics 
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Table 2.1:  Summary Statistics of Household Decision Making 
(Subsample: women have some power) 
 Joint 
decide 
(%) 
Husband 
decide 
(%) 
Wife  
decide 
(%) 
Total 
observation 
N 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sewing machine 56.8 21.0 22.2 715 
Washing machine 68.1 16.2 15.7 432 
Refrigerator 76.7 14.4 8.9 231 
Rice cooker 64.3 19.4 16.3 300 
Pressure cooker 68.0 16.0 16.0 311 
Electric fan 64.0 29.6 6.4 831 
Big wall clock 60.5 31.4 8.1 430 
Color TV 71.7 22.2 6.1 335 
Black/White TV 63.1 31.7 5.2 617 
Radio/Tape recorder 57.1 36.7 6.2 515 
VCR 68.9 24.3 6.8 40 
Camera 68.2 26.1 5.7 80 
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Table 2.2a: Descriptive statistics by Mother’s Headship 
 All  
Children 
 
(1) 
Children 
(Headed 
by 
Father) 
(2) 
Children  
(Headed 
by 
Mother) 
(3) 
T-test 
(p-
value) 
 
(4)= 
(2)-(3) 
Dependent Variable     
BMI 16.372 16.166   16.487 .038 
Underweight .223 .221 .255 .353 
Overweight .087 .062 .089 .048 
     
Independent variable     
Child Characteristics     
child Age 8.642 8.582 9.748 .000 
girls (%) .477 .476 .504 .383 
Mother’s Relative Attributes     
mother better educated than 
father 
.135 .128 .248 .000 
mother work while father not .010 .009 .026 .005 
mother cadre while father not .011 .009 .046 .000 
father’s age – mother’s age 1.733 1.711 2.149 .019 
mother minority while father not .058 .061 .000 .000 
mother better health than father .044 .043 .065 .085 
mother do house chores while 
father not 
.541 .528 .782 .000 
mother’s BMI 21.776 21.732 22.579 .000 
father’s BMI 21.621 21.601 21.988 .015 
Household Characteristics     
mother married .996 .996 1 .296 
live in urban site .214 .206 .363 .000 
live with parent-in-laws .482 .496 .237 .000 
# of children 2.261 2.267 2.142 .038 
household size 4.819 4.831 4.600  
household gross income(Chinese 
$) 
5905.95   
5873.44 
6501.12 .071 
     
N 4731 4486 245  
Note: Standard error clustered by community id; Age 2-15, Pooled 1991-1993 CHNS data.  
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Table 2.2b: Descriptive statistics by Mother’s Decision-making Power 
(Subsample: women have some power) 
 All  
Children 
 
 
(1) 
Children 
(father  
more 
power) 
(2) 
Children 
(mother  
more 
power) 
(3) 
T-test 
(p-
value) 
(4)= 
(2)-(3) 
Dependent Variable     
BMI 16.524 16.337 16.935 .013 
Underweight .221 .229 .202 .517 
Overweight .105 .094 .128 .270 
     
Independent variable     
Child Characteristics     
child Age 8.554 8.476 8.706 .346 
girls (%) .483 .486 .475 .720 
Mother’s Relative Attributes     
mother better educated than 
father 
.142 .145 .135 .648 
mother work while father not .008 .002 .016 .042 
mother cadre while father not .019 .018 .020 .820 
Father’ age - mother’s age 1.847 1.754 2.025 .128 
mother minority while father 
not 
.057 .042 .086 .002 
mother better health than 
father 
.044 .033 .066 .009 
mother do house chores while 
father not 
.628 .604 .676 .017 
mother’s BMI 22.061 22.040 22.101 .735 
father’s BMI 21.973 22.012 21.897 .477 
Household Characteristics     
mother married .996 .996 .995 .780 
live in urban site .302 .315 .286 .305 
live with parent-in-laws .495 .517 .451 .035 
# of children 2.115 2.138 2.068 .226 
household size 4.737 4.865 4.490 .000 
household gross income(Chinese 
$) 
6502.604 6863.377 5812.35 .003 
     
N 1054 694 360  
Note: Standard error clustered by community id; Age 2-15, Pooled 1991-1993 CHNS data 
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Table 2.3:  Summary Statistics of Community-Level Characteristics by Instrumental 
Variable 
 
Panel A: Headship Sample 
 Overall Cadre 
Evaluatio
n System 
(No)   
Cadre 
Evaluatio
n System 
(Yes) 
t-test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)-(3) 
Population size in the 
neighborhood 
2553.30 2294.21 2645.44 .01 
Daily wage of ordinary 
male workers 
5.77 5.60 5.83 .18 
Daily wage of ordinary 
female workers 
4.52 5.05 4.33 .00 
Daily wage of driver 287.21 287.98 286.93 .84 
Distance to provincial 
capital 
228.80 217.03 233.03 .00 
Distance to countyseat 16.61 15.76 16.97 .02 
Distance to primary 
school 
1.54 1.32 1.61 .01 
Distance to middle school 2.75 2.42 2.86 .00 
Whether neighborhood road 
is paved 
.44 .48 .43 .01 
# hours electricity 
available (day) 
21.32 21.20 21.36 .37 
N communities 181 49 132  
 
 
Panel B: Decision-making Sample 
 Overall Cadre 
Evaluatio
n System 
(No)   
Cadre 
Evaluatio
n System 
(Yes) 
t-test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)-(3) 
Population size in the 
neighborhood 
2444.82 2301.64 2501.92 .26 
Daily wage of ordinary 
male workers 
5.61 5.66 5.58 .70 
Daily wage of ordinary 
female workers 
4.88 5.84 4.49 .00 
Daily wage of driver 288.48 293.21 286.67 .56 
Distance to provincial 
capital 
230.06 233.75 228.56 .58 
Distance to countyseat 16.64 15.46 17.22 .11 
Distance to primary 
school 
1.76 1.42 1.84 .14 
Distance to middle school 2.47 2.93 2.31 .01 
Whether neighborhood road 
is paved 
.52 .55 .51 .17 
# hours electricity 
available (day) 
21.71 20.85 22.05 .00 
N communities 146 43 146  
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Table 2.4a: First Stage Regression of the IV-Estimations 
Dependent variable: Mother’s Headship 
 (1) (1) 
Instrumental variable   
Cadre Evaluation System 0.013* 0.019** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
   
Mother’s Relative Attributes   
Mother better educated than father  0.040*** 
  (0.012) 
Mother work while father not  0.061 
  (0.050) 
Mother cadre while father not  0.113* 
  (0.053) 
Father’s age-Mother’s age  -0.000 
  (0.001) 
Mother minority while father not  -0.055*** 
  (0.005) 
Mother better health while father not  0.017 
  (0.018) 
Mother do housework while father not  0.039*** 
  (0.006) 
Logarithm of mother’s BMI  0.093** 
  (0.033) 
Logarithm of father’s BMI  0.025 
  (0.034) 
Mother lower wage than father  0.043** 
  (0.016) 
Mother’s wage is missing  -0.005 
  (0.012) 
Household Characteristics   
Married   0.039*** 
  (0.012) 
Live in urban site  0.024* 
  (0.009) 
Living with parent-in-laws  -0.041*** 
  (0.006) 
Total number of children  0.001 
  (0.004) 
Household size  -0.001 
  (0.003) 
Logarithm of household income  -0.168 
  (0.089) 
Constant  0.279 
  (0.410) 
Provincial Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
F-statistics 14.60 9.79 
p-value 0.00 0.00 
N 4731 4731 
R-squared 0.022 0.068 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05); Sample is limited to women who have children aged 2-15 years 
old in pooled waves 1991-1993. 
42 
 
Table 2.4b: Impact of Mother’s Headship Status on Child Outcome (IV vs. OLS) 
Dependent variables: Child Health 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
 Log(BMI) Log(BMI) Over 
weight 
Over 
weight 
Under 
weight 
Under 
Weight 
Endogenous 
variable 
      
Mother as Head -0.009 0.580* -0.020 1.729** 0.018 -1.118 
 (0.007) (0.255) (0.015) (0.660) (0.028) (0.734) 
Mother’s Relative 
Attributes 
      
Mother better 
educated than 
father 
-0.003 -0.029* 0.000 -0.076* 0.034 0.082* 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.012) (0.037) (0.018) (0.038) 
Mother work while 
father not 
0.020 0.003 0.029 -0.026 -0.050 -0.015 
 (0.017) (0.032) (0.045) (0.097) (0.058) (0.079) 
Mother cadre while 
father not 
0.010 -0.052 0.052 -0.127 0.051 0.177 
 (0.022) (0.050) (0.044) (0.126) (0.058) (0.117) 
Father’s age -    
mother’s age 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mother minority 
while father not 
-0.010 0.019 0.000 0.097* 0.047 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.038) (0.027) (0.049) 
Mother better 
health while 
father not 
-0.006 -0.021 0.038 -0.004 0.025 0.058 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.022) (0.043) (0.031) (0.044) 
Mother do 
housework while 
father not 
0.001 -0.024* 0.001 -0.071* -0.008 0.036 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.030) (0.013) (0.034) 
Logarithm of 
mother’s BMI 
0.150*** 0.103** 0.135*** -0.012 -
0.447*** 
-
0.355*** 
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.034) (0.085) (0.052) (0.087) 
Logarithm of 
father’s BMI 
0.153*** 0.131*** 0.172*** 0.105 -
0.431*** 
-
0.406*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.039) (0.077) (0.057) (0.078) 
Mother lower wage 
than father 
-0.010 -0.035* 0.006 -0.066 0.008 0.056 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.017) (0.044) (0.024) (0.044) 
Mother’s wage is 
missing 
-0.007 -0.009 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.016 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026) 
Child 
Characteristics 
      
Age -
0.044*** 
-
0.045*** 
-
0.020*** 
-0.020* 0.023** 0.022* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
Age sq 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female -0.007 -0.011* -0.002 -0.012 0.045*** 0.053*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) 
Household 
Characteristics 
      
Married  -0.020 -0.033 -0.069 -0.101 0.037 0.085 
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 (0.024) (0.021) (0.090) (0.076) (0.089) (0.099) 
Live in urban site -0.006 -0.021* -0.004 -0.050* 0.052*** 0.084*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.023) (0.015) (0.025) 
Living with 
parents in-laws 
-0.002 0.019 -0.008 0.055* -0.009 -0.049 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.026) (0.012) (0.029) 
Total number of 
children 
-0.000 0.005 0.007 0.020 0.020* 0.010 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
Household size 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Logarithm of 
household income 
0.047* 0.098* 0.121* 0.274 0.026 -0.046 
 (0.023) (0.045) (0.050) (0.152) (0.082) (0.135) 
Constant 1.792*** 1.819*** -
1.194*** 
- 
1.120 
2.578*** 2.445*** 
 (0.126) (0.254) (0.275) (0.699) (0.443) (0.617) 
Provincial Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 28.29 21.41 10.38 11.52 13.25 9.83 
p-value 0.000 .000 0.000 .000 0.000 .000 
N 4731 4731 4731 4731 4731 4731 
R-squared 0.28  0.069  0.067  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
      *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 2.5a: First Stage Regression of the IV-Estimations 
Dependent variable: Mother’s Decision-maker 
(subsample: women have some power) 
 (1) (2) 
Instrumental variable   
Cadre Evaluation System 0.061* 0.087** 
 (0.026) (0.030) 
   
Mother’s Relative Attributes   
Mother better educated than father  -0.018 
  (0.041) 
Mother work while father not  0.098 
  (0.184) 
Mother cadre while father not  -0.083 
  (0.102) 
Father’s age-mother’s age  0.011* 
  (0.005) 
Mother minority while father not  0.103 
  (0.062) 
Mother better health while father not  0.065 
  (0.064) 
Mother do housework while father not  0.046 
  (0.032) 
Logarithm of mother’s BMI  0.145 
  (0.118) 
Logarithm of father’s BMI  -0.021 
  (0.124) 
Mother lower wage than father  0.093 
  (0.049) 
Mother’s wage is missing  0.037 
  (0.047) 
Household Characteristics   
Married   0.006 
  (0.203) 
Live in urban site  -0.065 
  (0.036) 
Living with parent-in-laws  -0.014 
  (0.029) 
Total number of children  -0.004 
  (0.019) 
Household size  -0.022* 
  (0.010) 
Logarithm of household income  -0.469* 
  (0.224) 
Constant 0.422*** 0.726 
 (0.040) (1.016) 
Provincial Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
F-statistics 7.62 5.14 
p-value 0.00 0.00 
N 1,054 1,054 
R-squared 0.037 0.075 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05); 
Sample is limited to women who have children aged 2-15 in the pooled waves 1991 
and 1993. 
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Table 2.5b: Impact of Mother’s Decision-making Status on Child Outcome (IV vs.OLS) 
Dependent variables: Child Health 
(Subsample: women have some power) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
 Log(BMI) Log(BMI) Over 
weight 
Over 
weight 
Under 
weight 
Under 
Weight 
Endogenous variable       
Mother as Decision 
- maker 
-0.002 0.184* -0.011 0.374 -0.016 -0.432 
 (0.008) (0.088) (0.019) (0.211) (0.028) (0.318) 
Mother’s Relative 
Attributes 
      
Mother better 
educated than 
father 
0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.009 0.010 0.024 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.029) (0.030) (0.038) (0.041) 
Mother work while 
father not 
0.042 0.018 0.110 0.060 0.114 0.161 
 (0.045) (0.059) (0.116) (0.148) (0.138) (0.172) 
Mother cadre while 
father not 
-0.037 -0.036 -0.029 -0.012 0.264*** 0.314* 
 (0.039) (0.054) (0.054) (0.080) (0.070) (0.132) 
Father’s age-
mother’s age 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.010* 0.001 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Mother minority 
while father not 
-0.019 -0.053* 0.001 -0.037 0.095 0.226** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.038) (0.052) (0.074) (0.078) 
Mother better 
health while Father 
not 
-0.026 -0.042* 0.002 -0.028 0.106 0.143* 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.033) (0.047) (0.066) (0.070) 
Mother do housework 
while father not 
-0.005 -0.014 -0.001 -0.022 -0.014 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.034) 
Logarithm of 
mother’s BMI 
0.154*** 0.132*** 0.186** 0.138 -
0.405*** 
-0.322** 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.070) (0.086) (0.108) (0.125) 
Logarithm of 
father’s BMI 
0.195*** 0.208*** 0.302*** 0.355*** -
0.419*** 
-0.404** 
 (0.034) (0.042) (0.086) (0.095) (0.109) (0.128) 
Mother lower wage 
than father 
0.009 -0.011 0.026 -0.010 -0.048 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.032) (0.042) (0.041) (0.060) 
Mother’s wage is 
missing 
0.008 -0.000 0.043 0.016 -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.033) (0.032) (0.043) (0.051) 
Child 
Characteristics 
      
Age -
0.042*** 
-
0.037*** 
-0.006 0.003 0.007 -0.012 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) 
Age sq 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female -0.016* -0.010 -0.017 -0.006 0.081** 0.059* 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.029) 
Household 
Characteristics 
      
Married  0.067** 0.007 0.088 -0.044 -0.361* -0.248 
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 (0.023) (0.040) (0.078) (0.108) (0.178) (0.199) 
Live in urban site -0.017 -0.007 -0.028 -0.012 0.070* 0.042 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.027) (0.030) (0.035) (0.039) 
Living with parents 
in-laws 
-0.014 -0.013 -0.035 -0.024 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) 
Total number of 
children 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.013 -0.008 0.040* 0.040* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) 
Household size 0.004 0.009* 0.013 0.022* -0.020* -0.033* 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) 
Logarithm of 
household income 
0.161** 0.114 0.317* 0.259 -0.325 -0.172 
 (0.058) (0.074) (0.132) (0.161) (0.230) (0.250) 
Constant 1.035** 1.203** -
2.874*** 
-2.740** 4.499*** 3.712** 
 (0.333) (0.379) (0.769) (0.865) (1.150) (1.244) 
Provincial Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 19.81 15.89 5.33 5.11 6.61 4.72 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 
R-squared 0.318  0.083  0.093  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05); Sample is limited to women who have children aged 2-15 in the pooled 
waves 1991 and 1993. 
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Table 2.6: Robustness Check of Decision-Making Measurement 
 
Panel A: Female-Type Goods vs. Male-Type Goods Subsamples 
 (1) (2) 
 Female-Type Goods Male-Type Goods 
 IV IV 
 Log(BMI) Log(BMI) 
Endogenous variable   
Mother as Decision-maker 0.126 0.253* 
 (0.309) (0.125) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Provincial Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
N 625 714 
Notes: *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; Robust standard errors in parentheses; Sample is limited to 
women who have children aged 2-15 in the pooled waves 1991 and 1993. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Wives make more purchasing decision than husbands in terms of the total 
number of household durable goods. 
 IV 
 Log(BMI) 
Endogenous variable  
Mother as Decision-maker 0.017 
 (0.060) 
Controls Yes 
Provincial Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
N 825 
Notes: *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; Robust standard errors in parentheses; Sample is limited to 
women who have children aged 2-15 in the pooled waves 1991 and 1993. 
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Table 2.7: Various Sample Selections 
Panel A: Rural vs. Urban Subsamples 
 (1) (2) 
 Rural Urban 
 IV IV 
 Log(BMI) Log(BMI) 
Endogenous variable   
Mother as Head 0.978 0.323* 
 (0.770) (0.161) 
N 3718 1027 
Mother as Decision-maker 0.090 0.309 
 (0.074) (0.394) 
N 738 326 
Controls Yes Yes 
Provincial Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%;  
 
Panel B: Girls vs. Boys Subsamples 
 (1) (2) 
 Girls Boys 
 IV IV 
 Log(BMI) Log(BMI) 
Endogenous variable   
Mother as Head 0.416* 1.071 
 (0.212) (0.966) 
N 2262 2469 
Mother as Decision-maker 0.192* 0.127 
 (0.092) (0.129) 
N 520 534 
Controls Yes Yes 
Provincial Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%;  
 
Panel C: One-child Household vs. Multiple-children Household Subsamples 
 (1) (2) 
 One-Child Multiple-Children 
 IV IV 
 Log(BMI) Log(BMI) 
Endogenous variable   
Mother as Head 0.224 0.639* 
 (0.904) (0.265) 
N 1010 3721 
Mother as Decision-maker -0.053 0.210* 
 (0.644) (0.090) 
N 280 774 
Controls Yes Yes 
Provincial Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%;  
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Appendix: 
1, Proof of first order conditions (F.O.C.s) (equation (3)). 
The household is treated as a single unit maximizing a linear combination of two 
parents’ utility function. I set up the Lagrangian method as below: 
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Done.  
2, Proof of equation (4). 
By using the first order condition for the child quality Q, I define 
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Then, take derivative with respect to mother’s reservation utility mU  to get  
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End of proof.  
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Table 2.A1: Impact of Father’s Decision-making Status on Child Outcome (only OLS) 
Dependent variables: Child Health 
(Subsample: women are completely powerless) 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS OLS 
 Log(BMI) Log(BMI) 
Endogenous variable   
Husband is dictator 0.014** 0.013* 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Mother’s Relative Attributes   
Mother better educated than father  0.001 
  (0.007) 
Mother work while father not  0.039 
  (0.023) 
Mother cadre while father not  0.013 
  (0.022) 
Father’s age-mother’s age  -0.000 
  (0.001) 
Mother minority while father not  -0.012 
  (0.015) 
Mother better health while Father not  -0.010 
  (0.012) 
Mother do housework while father not  0.001 
  (0.006) 
Logarithm of mother’s BMI  0.165*** 
  (0.020) 
Logarithm of father’s BMI  0.144*** 
  (0.027) 
Mother lower wage than father  -0.004 
  (0.009) 
Mother’s wage is missing  -0.004 
  (0.009) 
Child Characteristics Yes Yes 
Household Characteristics Yes Yes 
Provincial Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Constant 2.786*** 1.608*** 
 (0.006) (0.187) 
F-statistics 35.71 35.43 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
N 3,422 3,422 
R-squared 0.063 0.295 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05); Sample is limited to women who have children aged 2-15 in the pooled 
waves 1991 and 1993. 
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Table 2.A2: Variable Measurements  
  
Dependent Variable  
BMI Weight in kilograms/height in meters 
squared 
Underweight 1=underweight; 0 otherwise 
Overweight 1=overweight; 0 otherwise 
  
  
Independent variable  
Child Characteristics  
Child Age Age in years 
Girls (%) 1=female; 0 otherwise 
Mother’s Relative Attributes  
Wife Better Educated  1=wife has more education than husband; 0 
otherwise 
Wife Work While Husband Not 1=wife currently work and husband not; 0 
otherwise 
Wife Cadre While Husband Not 1=wife is cadre and husband isn’t; 0 
otherwise 
Husband-Wife Age Difference husband’s age –wife’s age (in years) 
 
Wife Minority While Husband 
Not 
1=wife is minority and husband isn’t; 0 
otherwise 
Wife Better Health 1=wife’s self-reported health is 
excellent or good, and husband’s self-
reported health is fair or poor; 0 
otherwise 
Wife Do House Chores 1=wife does household chores (buy food or 
cook food) and husband doesn’t; 0 
otherwise 
Wife’s BMI Wife’s weight/sq of height 
Husband’s BMI Husband’s weight/sq of height 
Household Characteristics  
Wife Married 1=wife is married, 0=never 
married/divorced/ widowed/separated 
Live in Urban Site 1=urban neighborhoods or county town 
neighborhoods; 0=suburban neighborhoods 
or villages 
Live with In-Laws 1=wife live with parents-in-laws; 0 
otherwise 
# of Children Total number of own children in the 
household 
Household Size Total number of people residing in the 
household 
Household Gross 
Income(Chinese $) 
Household gross income in Chinese 
currency 
Household have Only One 
Child(%) 
Dichotomous 
  
Note: Pooled 1991-1993 CHNS data. 
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Table 2.A3: Age-Gender Specific International Cutoff points for BMI for Thinness and Fatness 
(Averaging data from Brazil, Netherlands, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Singapore, and US) 
 Thinness Overweight 
  Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Age (years)      
2.0 15.14 14.83 18.41 18.02 
2.5 14.92 14.63 18.13 17.76 
3.0 14.74 14.47 17.89 17.56 
3.5 14.57 14.32 17.69 17.40 
4.0 14.43 14.19 17.55 17.28 
4.5 14.31 14.06 17.47 17.19 
5.0 14.21 13.94 17.42 17.15 
5.5 14.13 13.86 17.45 17.20 
6.0 14.07 13.82 17.55 17.34 
6.5 14.04 13.82 17.71 17.53 
7.0 14.04 13.86 17.92 17.75 
7.5 14.08 13.93 18.16 18.03 
8.0 14.15 14.02 18.44 18.35 
8.5 14.24 14.14 18.76 18.69 
9.0 14.35 14.28 19.10 19.07 
9.5 14.49 14.43 19.46 19.45 
10.0 14.64 14.61 19.84 19.86 
10.5 14.80 14.81 20.20 20.29 
11.0 14.97 15.05 20.55 20.74 
11.5 15.16 15.32 20.89 21.20 
12.0 15.35 15.62 21.22 21.68 
12.5 15.58 15.93 21.56 22.14 
13.0 15.84 16.26 21.91 22.58 
13.5 16.12 16.57 22.27 22.98 
14.0 16.41 16.88 22.62 23.34 
14.5 16.69 17.18 22.96 23.66 
15.0 16.98 17.45 23.29 23.94 
15.5 17.26 17.69 23.60 24.17 
16.0 17.54 17.91 23.90 24.37 
16.5 17.80 18.09 24.19 24.54 
17.0 18.05 18.25 24.46 24.70 
17.5 18.28 18.38 24.73 24.85 
18.0 18.50 18.50 25.00 25.00 
Source: Tim J Cole, Katherine M Flegal, Dasha Nicholls, Alan A Jackson (2000; 2007) 
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Chapter 3 
Computer and Internet Café Usage: A Study of Their Adverse Health Effect on Chinese 
Adolescents and Youth 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This paper examines the association between computer use, internet café usage 
and health behaviors and health outcomes among a group of Chinese adolescents and 
youths, using data from recent longitudinal surveys. The six health indicators are 
smoking, drinking, obesity, overweight, underweight and self-reported poor health status.  
 It has been widely recognized that the diffusion of technology, particularly by the 
widespread use of computers in the workplace, plays a crucial role in national economic 
growth and development (Autor, Katz and Krueger 1998; Autor, Levy and Murnane 
2003). However, the evidence of its impact on the development of youth and adolescents 
is mixed. Using data from the 2001 Current Population Survey (CPS) computer use 
supplement, Fairlie (2005) found an association between home computer access and 
higher likelihood of enrollment in school. Using the 1988 National Educational 
Longitudinal Survey (NELS-88), Attewell and Battle (1999) showed a positive impact of 
home computer use on students’ math and reading scores. In contrast, Fuchs and 
Woessmann (2004) found that home computers had a negative effect on math and 
reading scores after controlling for observable characteristics of students, families and 
schools. Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2010) conducted a field experiment in Romania in 
which vouchers for the purchase of home computers were provided to low-income 
children. Their findings were mixed: students that won vouchers received lower school 
grades in math, English, and Romanian, but higher scores in tests of computer use. 
Finally, Angrist and Lavy (2002) found no effect from computer use on math test scores 
in Israeli schools. However, none of the above studies examined the potential effects of 
computer use on health. 
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 Computer use in China is quite different from its counterparts in industrialized 
countries.  Since relatively few Chinese owned computers at home in the early 2000s, 
most youths aged 15-30 years old went to internet cafés to get online and to play games. 
As a result of an apparently alarming rise in the number of youths spending time in 
internet cafés and playing online games, governments at all levels initiated regulations to 
curb illegal internet cafés and to censor unhealthy online information. However, driven 
by high profits, many illegal internet cafés still operated, attracting young customers by 
lowering internet costs and increasing hours of operation. Despite extensive media 
coverage and concern by parents about the adverse effects of extensive internet use, 
citing negatives such as sleep deprivation, malnutrition, and social isolation, no well-
designed research study has attempted to conduct a causal analysis of internet café usage 
and its impact on youth health.  
 My research contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First of all, I will 
use fixed effects method to deal with the problem of endogeneity, a problem that 
commonly occurs in studies using more conventional statistical approaches such as 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). I explain these problems in more depth in the Methods 
section. Second, I specifically examine the role of internet cafés and attempt to find out 
how this particular environment affects youth health. There are two potential 
explanations for possible adverse health outcomes: physical inactivity and poor dietary 
intake. Extended screen hours and reduced nutrition associated with internet café usage 
would then lead to worse health outcomes. Third, my study based on this Chinese sample 
may inspire new rigorous studies to examine the effect of internet café use on youth in 
other developing countries. I address the potential causal impact of internet café usage on 
health using two waves of the 2004-2006 China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
dataset.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the background information 
about computer use, internet café usage and their potential impacts on youth. Section 3 
attempts to set out the conceptual framework for understanding the association between 
computer use and health. Section 4 describes the dataset, the major measurements, along 
with summary statistics. Section 5 introduces the empirical framework and discussion of 
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potential endogeneity. Section 6 describes the major research findings and potential 
mechanisms. Section 7 makes concluding remarks and lays out some policy implications.   
 
3.2 Background 
 In this section, I discuss three issues. First, how are the effects of youth computer 
use different than the effects of television watching? Second, is youth computer use 
associated with higher rates of smoking and drinking? Third, how is computer use related 
to nutrition status? 
3.2.1 Comparing the health consequences between computer use and television 
watching 
Although both computer use and TV watching are sedentary activities and both 
decrease time spent being physically active, their relationship with health does not appear 
to be identical. Prior research has documented the ways in which television viewing 
affects weight status (Janssen et al. 2004; Sisson et al. 2010). While watching TV, 
viewers may increase their caloric intake by snacking; select and consume low-nutrient, 
high-calorie foods such as instant noodles or soda pop that are shown in advertisements; 
and refrain from the physical activities which are essential to lose weight or maintain a 
normal weight.  
In contrast, computer use may affect the youth health in different ways. First, 
parents have less control over the locations where youth access computers. In my pooled 
sample, the home computer ownership rate is only 15 percent. The urban-rural divide is 
obvious, with 30% of urban households having computers versus only 10% among rural 
households. Due to the relatively low rates of access to home computers, the internet café 
has become the primary setting for computer access. Without parental supervision, youth 
health could be worsened in internet cafés if they eat more unhealthy food, or eat 
irregularly; or adopt unhealthy behaviors such as smoking, drinking, and internet 
gambling. Internet café users also risk extensive exposure to secondhand smoke. In sharp 
contrast, watching TV is more likely to occur at home and therefore can potentially be 
regulated by parents or other adults in the household.  
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Second, negative peer effects can be quite strong in the internet café. The majority 
of internet café users in China are adolescents who come from middle- or low-income 
families since upper-income families have computers at home for their children. If 
frequent internet café users engage in unhealthy behaviors such as smoking and drinking, 
other youth are likely to mimic them and to learn an unhealthy lifestyle from observing 
negative behaviors in the   environment.  
Third, the positive effects of the information available on the internet are 
countered by the availability of unhealthy information that can be accessed despite some 
internet cafés’ installations of ‘purifiers’. In China, by contrast, TV contents can be more 
easily regulated and censored.  
Fourth, computer users sit in front of the screen for long periods. This leads to 
increased fat accumulation and causes physical strains. As a result, users are at risk of 
gaining weight and experiencing generally poor health. In contrast, it is not necessary to 
sit in order to watch TV. People can even do household chores, and exercise while 
watching TV since TV doesn’t require operation of mouse.  
Fifth, computer use can occur at any time of the day. Since most internet cafés 
operate 24 hours a day, have restrooms and sell junk foods, users can stay overnight. 
Even when using home computers, users can have opportunity to stay up late. Lack of 
sleep is associated with health difficulties such as weight gain or loss, hypertension, and 
stress and anxiety.  In contrast, most TV programs in China end at midnight, reducing the 
effects of television viewing on sleep.  
3.2.2 Smoking and drinking among youth 
 Widespread smoking has been a big public health problem in China for a number 
of years (Lam et al., 1997).  This issue is particularly vital in the case of adolescents and 
youth since their early exposure to smoking may produce a lifelong nicotine addiction. 
Since adolescents are still in the habit formation stage, they can learn the new behavior 
quickly by observing the behavior of others, especially friends and peers. Even if 
participants in internet café don’t smoke themselves, the risk of exposure to secondhand 
smoke increases along with long hours of physical inactivity in internet café. 
Consequently, smoking and inactivity become double health hazards.  
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 Similarly, alcohol use has increasingly become a serious problem in China. 
According to WHO studies (2000), 82.6 percent of Chinese males aged 15-65 drink 
alcohol. It is also well documented that drinking alcohol is one of the contributing factors 
to chronic diseases and accidental injuries. The growth of internet cafés has increased 
access to alcohol for youth, so that it has become a common beverage among the younger 
generation. In addition to the easy access of alcoholic beverages, the peer pressure 
encourages drinking among youth as they try to assimilate into a new group. Behaviors 
such as drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes are often interconnected and tend to 
become lifelong habits. More details will be presented in the descriptive statistics section.   
3.2.3 Obesity, overweight and underweight  
 As China is experiencing rapid economic growth and dramatic transformation, 
young adults are modifying their diet by consuming more fast food and foods high in 
calories; by drinking more soda/pop; and by spending more time using computers, which 
all contribute to an unhealthy lifestyle. In this paper, I use body mass index (BMI), an 
anthropometric indicator of short-run nutrition status, as another dependent variable. I 
investigate both obesity and malnutrition since they represent two opposite extremes on 
the spectrum of body fat distribution, and both can be measured in terms of weight and 
height. 
 There is increasing evidence suggesting that obesity has become a global 
epidemic and a primary public health concern in many countries (WHO 2000). The 
growing recognition of the social and economic consequence of childhood obesity has 
stimulated extensive studies across disciplines. Obese children have been reported to 
suffer a higher risk of poor health (Hannon et al. 2005) and morbidity (Reither et al. 
2009). Obesity itself has been discovered to track from childhood to adulthood 
(Freedman et al. 2005) and can cause functional limitations in the late life (Himes 2000). 
Other than causing poor physical health, obesity is also found to be a major source of 
social stigma (Puhl and Heuer 2009) and to lower the probability of marriage (Averett 
and Korenman 1999).  
 There are many measures of fatness and obesity such as Body Mass Index (BMI), 
skinfold thickness, and waist circumference, with each having own strength and 
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weakness. Among them, BMI is the most frequently used measurement, particularly in 
population surveys, due to its straightforward calculation as a simple ratio of weight in 
kilograms divided by height in squared meters (kg/m
2
). The past decade has seen a 
significant increase in overweight or obesity among children and adolescents. For 
example, Johnston and O’Malley (2003) used the Monitoring the Future Study (MTF) 
data and found that BMI had risen at all grade levels for both boys and girls in the mid of 
1990s, except that eighth grade girls showed little change over time. The increase in the 
prevalence of overweight was most substantial among the twelfth graders whose 
prevalence rate almost tripled in the period between 1986 and 2002.  
The natural question to ask is why BMI has increased so much recently and what 
factors may be contributing to this phenomenon. Chaloupka and Johnston (2007) provide 
a conceptual model that identifies four sources of determinants: behavioral, individual, 
social and environmental factors. The behavioral factors point to individuals’ daily food 
consumption and physical activity. The individual factors examine genetic traits and 
socioeconomic characteristics. The social factors focus on family and peer influences. 
The environmental factors suggest that a wide range of variables including locations such 
as neighborhoods, schools, and local markets; the media; and public policies all play a 
role in the rise in obesity observed in many countries, both developed and developing 
ones. Using data from the MTF survey and with multivariate analyses, Delva et al (2007) 
find evidence that an unhealthy weight is associated with a concurrent reduction in 
physical exercises and consumption of green vegetables, and an increase in sedentary 
activities such as TV watching. The level of severity varies across different racial and 
ethnicity groups with Hispanic boys and African American girls disproportionately 
having a higher prevalence of obesity. Examining community-level factors, Powell et al 
(2007)  found that access to chain supermarkets contributed to a decline in adolescent 
obesity whereas living in a neighborhood with a higher proportion of low-income 
residents is associated with higher obesity rates.  
 China is no exception from to this international trend. The increasing number of 
overweight and obese children in China has recently become concern since economic 
reform and social change has considerably transformed the population’s dietary habits, 
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increased tolerance for higher body weights, and decreased physical activity. Evaluating 
the prevalence of metabolic syndrome in a group of obese children aged 7-16 in an 
eastern coastal province of China, Fu et al (2007) find that obesity is strongly associated 
with metabolic abnormalities. Using a cross-sectional sample of Chinese children aged 6-
13 years old in Hong Kong, Sung and his colleagues (2007) show that overweight is 
correlated with cardiovascular risk factors in childhood which can track into adulthood.   
 In contrast to overweight and obesity, undernourishment is another health 
concern. Failure to consume adequate energy to meet basic growth needs can have long-
lasting effects such as stunting and developmental deficits (WHO, 2002), and low labor 
productivity (Dasgupta and Ray 1986).   
 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
In this section, I propose two ways in which computer use in internet cafés can 
affect health outcomes among Chinese youth.  
First are the lifestyle effects of this use. The advancement of information 
technology has made computers penetrate into almost every part of our daily life, 
including study, work, play, shop and other activities. The direct consequence of heavy 
computer use is to displace more vigorous physical activities and reduce daily energy 
expenditure. It has become common knowledge that regular physical activities have 
plenty of health benefits, including reduced risk of heart diseases, arthritis, cognitive 
impairment, depression, and anxiety. However, the sedentary lifestyle associated with 
heavy computer use could generate significant health outcomes. Leon et al (2007) 
provide empirical evidence about the amount of weekly computer use and the changes in 
habitual spinal postures among Australian adolescents. Studies by DeMattia et al (2007) 
report a strong association between the computer use and high prevalence of obesity 
among adolescents. Other researchers have established that adolescent obesity is a strong 
predictor of cardiovascular danger in adulthood and later life (Gunnell et al, 1998).  In the 
following discussion, I will present some empirical evidence about how these 
mechanisms play a role in determining adolescents’ health.  
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Second, heavy computer use in cafes may encourage the formation of social 
networks that promote negative behavior. Studies have found that adolescents attempt to 
disassociate from their parents and spend more time with their peers in their teenage 
years (Voorhees et al., 2005). The formation of adolescent peer groups could be caused 
by many different factors: attending the same class, living in the same neighborhood, 
being relatives or family connections, or having the same opinions or behaviors.  As a 
result of spending time together, individuals tend to imitate their behaviors based upon 
their peers - playing the same sports and games, eating the same types of food, visiting 
the same websites, and sharing many other habits. The shared behaviors between an 
individual and peers may directly or indirectly affect his/her health status. Unsupervised 
adolescents in internet cafés may imitate the behavior of their peers by eating instant 
noodles; smoking heavily; drinking alcoholic beverages; continuously playing computer 
games; and surfing the same internet web pages. Most of these shared behaviors appear 
to be detrimental to health, and are more likely to occur in the café setting. In sharp 
contrast, adolescents not visiting internet cafés may have healthier behaviors since 
parents can restrict bad behaviors and support good ones. A more extensive discussion 
will be presented in the following section.  
 
3.4 Data and Summary Statistics 
3.4.1 Data Description and Major Measurements 
To study the relationship between internet café usage and youth health outcomes, 
I will use the 2004 and 2006 waves of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), 
administered by the Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
The CHNS is a longitudinal survey with a sample of approximately 4,400 households 
with 16,000 individuals drawn to represent nine provinces, including two rich coastal 
provinces, five middle-income provinces and two poor interior provinces. The provincial 
city, one low-income city and four rural sites are randomly selected in each province. The 
survey includes a wide range of information on health, nutrition, daily activities for each 
person residing in the household. The restricted community-level dataset provides useful 
information on commodity price, health facility, administrative structure, relevant 
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national policy implementation, and neighborhood/village demographic composition and 
economic development. After fulfilling the requirements set by the data administrative 
center, I have gained access to this restricted community dataset.  
 I limit the sample to adolescents and youth aged 15-30 years old at any wave. The 
panel is unbalanced, and there is high attrition rate. Table 1 presents the data structure of 
the key explanatory variables and all dependent variables. Column (1) describes the 
characteristics of those respondents who only appear once in the first wave of 2004. 
Column (2) introduces those who only appear once in the second wave of 2006. Column 
(3) explains the characteristics of those who stay in both waves. Column (4) distinguishes 
those observations that appear at both waves, and categorizes these individuals into three 
types: stayers who don’t change their computer use status in both periods; enterers who 
switch from not using to using a computer; leavers who use computer only in the first 
period. The panel estimation will rely on those enterers and leavers.  
A few things stand out in this table. First, the incidence of computer use in 
aggregate increased over time from 22.11% in 2004 to 42.01% in 2006, and the trend 
remains even after breaking down the settings into café only, both café and home, and 
home only. Nearly 50 percent of the individuals access the computer in internet cafés 
only. In aggregate, enterers account for 11.4% of the stay-in-both-wave sample, leavers 
make up 3.4% of the sample and stayers comprise the remaining 85.3%.  Overall, there 
are more enterers than leavers for each type of computer users.  
Second, Table 1 also reports the data structure for the dependent variables. The 
prevalence of smoking and drinking both increase over time, from 34.64% to 42.94% and 
from 38.60% to 49.38%, respectively. For those observations that appear in both waves, 
10.88% of individuals start smoking in the second wave and 6.87% of them stop smoking 
in the second wave. Similarly, there are higher fractions of individuals who start drinking 
(17.68%) and stop drinking (7.79%) in the second wave. The asymmetric trend between 
changes from no to yes and changes from yes to no may reflect the increasing acceptance 
of smoking and drinking among Chinese youth.  
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Changes also occur in three other variables.  The rate of youth obesity and 
overweight is increasing and the rate of underweight is decreasing over the two periods. 
It also seems that there is a decline in the self-reported poor health status.  
 
3.4.2 Major Measurements 
Health Behavior and Health Outcome Measures.  I have six health indicators. (1) Two 
indicators measure health behaviors: whether smoking cigarettes and drinking alcoholic 
beverage at the time of the interview. This analysis is limited to the male subsample since 
less than 10 percent of females report smoking or drinking. (2) Another three 
dichotomous indicators, namely obesity, overweight and underweight, are measured by 
the Body Mass Index (BMI) with a value of 1 indicating a bad health outcome. For youth 
over 18 years old, obesity is defined as 1 with a BMI over 30.0 kg/m
2
, overweight with a 
BMI of 25.0-29.9 kg/m
2
, and underweight with a BMI below 18.5 kg/m
2
. For adolescents 
15-17 years old, their body weight distribution is different than that of adults, so is the 
definition of obesity, overweight and underweight. I will therefore use the age-gender 
specific cutoff values created by Cole et al (2000; 2007), who use six international 
surveys from Brazil, Great Britain, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Singapore, and the 
United States to generate an internationally comparable prevalence rates of underweight 
and overweight among children
1
. (3) The last indicator, namely self-reported poor health 
status, is based on the survey question “how would you describe your health compared to 
that of other people your age?” Youth are classified as poor health if they report poor or 
fair health status.   
    
Computer Use and Internet Café Usage Measures. In aggregate, the subject is asked 
whether use computer and how much time is spent on it during a typical day Mon-Fri, 
and a typical day Sat-Sun. Based on the time use data, I construct a continuous computer 
use variable with zero indicating no computer access and positive number indicating the 
                                                          
1
 For boys, the cutoffs for underweight are 16.98 kg/m
2
(15 yrs old), 17.54 kg/m2(16 yrs old), and 18.05 kg/m
2
(17 yrs 
old); the cutoffs for overweight are 23.29 kg/m
2
(15 yrs old), 23.90 kg/m
2
(16 yrs old), and 24.46 kg/m
2
(17 yrs old); the 
cutoffs for obesity are 28.30 kg/m
2
(15 yrs old), 28.88 kg/m
2
(16 yrs old), and 29.41 kg/m
2
(17 yrs old). For girls, the 
cutoffs for underweight are 17.45 kg/m
2
(15 yrs old), 17.91 kg/m
2
(16 yrs old), and 18.25 kg/m
2
(17 yrs old); the cutoffs 
for overweight are 23.94 kg/m
2
(15 yrs old), 24.37 kg/m
2
(16 yrs old), 24.70 kg/m
2
(17 yrs old); the cutoffs for obesity 
are 29.11 kg/m
2
(15 yrs old), 29.43 kg/m
2
(16 yrs old), and 29.69 kg/m
2
(17 yrs old). 
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total weekly hours (5*weekday+2*weekend). I conduct graphic analysis of the 
distribution of this aggregated computer use.  
The focus of the paper is to explore whether computer use in internet café affects 
youth health. Therefore, I distinguish three different types of computer users: in café 
only, at home only, both in café and at home. This classification is easily done for the 
second wave since the subjects are asked where they can access the internet. The possible 
responses are “internet café,” “at home,” “at friend’s or relative’s home,” and “in 
school.”  Combined with the survey question whether the household owns computer, I 
define the following three categories. (1) Users in café only are those individuals who 
only get access to internet in café and don’t own computer at home. (2) Users at home 
only are those who access the internet at home-based setting: at home, at friend’s or 
relative’s home, or in school. A small number of individuals who report no internet 
access but own home computers are also included in this category. (3) Users both in café 
and at home are those individuals who have access to the internet both in café and home-
based settings (friend’s home, relative’s home or school).  
 The classification of those three types of computer users for the first wave is 
different since the survey question is designed differently in the early wave. (1) Subjects 
are categorized into “in café only” if they can access the internet only in cafés and don’t 
own a computer at home. (2) Subjects are categorized into “at home only” if they can 
access the internet at home only. Those individuals who report home computer ownership 
and no internet connection are also included in this category. (3) Subjects are categorized 
into “both in café and at home” if they report access to the internet in both in cafés and on 
their own computers at home.  
There is concern about the measurement error in the internet café usage variable. 
Youth are interviewed with their parents present, which may lead to underreports of  time 
spent in cafés,  which have a negative  reputation in China. The extent of underreporting 
may vary by user type. (1) If café users with positive hours systematically underreport 
their actual use hours in both waves, my estimates will be considered as the lower bound 
of true estimates. (2) Zero-use reporting is an extreme of underreporting. In the case of 
marginal users who report no usage in both waves while they actually visit cafés, this 
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underreporting won’t cause problems since “no-changers” have no impact on fixed 
effects estimation. (3) When marginal users report some positive hours in one wave but 
zero hours in the other wave, this underreporting may bias the fixed effect estimates 
because this type of “changer” is spurious. Table 1 presents that 12.19% of the total café 
users switch their types across two waves with enters accounting for 7.14% and leavers 
for 5.05%. Based on these numbers, the third type of misreporting will possibly account 
for a very small percentage of my sample, and a few cases won’t bias the overall fixed 
effects estimation.  
 
Personal Characteristics. The socio-demographic variables include age, age squared, 
female dummy, educational categories, minority status, and indicators of whether the 
individual is currently in school, is working now, and is married. I create four levels of 
educational attainment: 1=elementary or below, 2=middle school, 3=high school, 
4=college or above.  
In the conceptual framework, I propose two potential explanations to link the 
relationship between computer use and health outcomes - lifestyle effects and social 
network effects. Accordingly, I include two types of variable to approximate these two 
mechanisms. (1) Screen-based media hours: a continuous time use variable summarizing 
the total hours spent in three sedentary activities such as watching TV, DVDs, and video 
games in a typical week. If computer use leads to unpleasant health outcomes, I want to 
test whether this linkage is through an increase in screen time. Does computer substitute 
or complement the TV-based screen hours? (2) Four variables measure individual food 
energy intake on a daily base – the natural logarithm of total calorie consumption, the 
share of carbohydrate, the share of fat, and the share of protein in total calorie. The 
original data only include the total grams consumed in carbohydrates, fat, and protein 
each day, and I transform those grams into the percentage of calories in a typical diet that 
comes from a certain component. For example, the percentage of calories coming from 
fat is calculated by multiplying grams of fat by 9 calories per gram and then dividing total 
calories. The multiplier for carbohydrate is 4, so is protein. I will examine whether there 
is an association between various composition of food intakes and computer use. If youth 
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in cafés tend to mimic each other by eating the same type of food, snacks and drinks, I 
expect a distinct pattern between café users and non-users.  
 
Household-level Characteristics. Three variables from the household survey are included. 
They are: (1) a dummy for living in urban site, (2) a continuous variable measuring 
household size, (3) the log value of household gross income per capita.  
 
Community-level Characteristics. Two variables from the community survey are included: 
a dummy whether having fast food restaurant in the neighborhood, and a dummy whether 
access to cable TV. It is well documented that fast food and TV advertisements are two 
important factors influencing people’s diet and eating habits. The province dummies are 
included to control for the time-invariant characteristics at the provincial level.  
 It is worth mentioning that the CHNS data don’t have sampling weights. Unlike 
many other longitudinal datasets such as Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) which 
provides the sampling weights for national estimates, the CHNS doesn’t present such 
weights due to initial restrictions from Chinese authorities. Although the weighted results 
are generally preferred to the un-weighted ones for inference about the population of 
interest, the analysis without population weights still suggests good estimation. There are 
three reasons. First, the CHNS is a large national survey covering nine provinces with 
different levels of economic and developmental indicators. This wide geographic 
coverage enables the CHNS to express the enormous heterogeneity in various social, 
economic, and behavioral statuses across the country for analysis. Second, the 
longitudinal design of the CHNS captures those dramatic changes both spatially and 
temporally. Third, a multistage and random cluster sampling procedure assures its 
representativeness. A weighted sampling scheme was used to randomly select four 
counties and two cities in each province based on their income level. Villages within each 
county and neighborhoods within each city are also randomly selected. Then, twenty 
households from each community are randomly selected for interviews. This multistage 
and random sampling covers a range of economic and demographic circumstances, being 
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representative nationally. Therefore, the results without population weights still generate 
reasonable insights for the target population I am interested in.     
 
3.4.3 Summary Statistics 
 Two graphs in Figure 1 show the distribution of computer use for adolescents and 
youth who are 15-30 years old at any wave. The top panel shows the average weekly use 
hours by age. The pattern is clear that youth in the age range 17-24 appears to be the most 
intense computer users, and they on average spend 5 hours in front of computer screen 
every week. Males on average spend one more hour on computer regardless of age. The 
lower panel shows the participation rate of using computer across different ages. It also 
confirms that youth aged 17-24 use computers more frequent. More than 30 percent of 
youth 17-24 yrs old report having access to a computer, while less than 25 percent of 
youth 25+ years old have  this access, and the same is the true for younger youth aged 15-
16 yrs old. The incidence of computer use is also greater among males regardless of age. 
On average, males tend to use computer more frequently and to spend more hours on it 
than female regardless of age.  
 As illustrated in Figure 2, the average weekly screen-based media use hours are 
different among three settings. Three types of media hours are compared in the graph: TV 
hours, DVD and video hours, and computer use hours. Café users spend the longest time 
watching TV (15 hours/wk), followed by home users and both users (12 hours/wk vs. 
11.5 hours/wk). Café users also spend the longest time watching DVDs and playing video 
games (9 hours/wk). The survey questionnaire provides no clue as to where the 
individuals watch DVDs and play video games. They could be displayed on TV screen or 
computer monitor. Interestingly, both users turn out to be the most intense computer 
users, spending nearly 19 hours on computers every week. Café users spend 12 hours on 
computers every week versus home users who spend 11.5 hours/wk.  
 Based on the average weekly hours of computer use, the subjects are categorized 
into three groups: “light users (<=7 hours/wk)”, “moderate users (between 7.01 and 28 
hours/wk)”, and “heavy users (over 28 hours/wk)” of the computer. Figure 3 describes 
the distribution of computer use hours by location and frequency. Among all café users, 
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43.67% are classified as light, 47.38% as moderate and 8.95% as heavy. The distribution 
of home users is very similar with that of café users. In contrast, a greater proportion of 
users in both settings belong to moderate and heavy categories (53.62% vs. 22.22%). 
Seemingly, youth who can access to computers in multiple sources (both in café and at 
home) turn out to be the most intense users.   
Table 2 provides an overview of the community-level characteristics between 
computer users and non users. Their communities vary along every dimension, including 
geographic, demographic and economic heterogeneity. In the pooled sample, computer 
users reside in 159 communities versus non users, who reside in 207 communities. 
Apparently, computer users live in nicer neighborhoods/villages with larger population 
sizes and areas, higher wage rates for ordinary workers and drivers. These areas are 
closer to schools and have a higher fraction of paved road and lower incidence of 
electricity cutoff. In terms of internet service and fast food restaurants, the two most 
important factors related to computer access, there is considerable variability across these 
two types of communities. 72% of communities where computer users dwell have 
internet cafés whereas the corresponding figure for communities with inactive computer 
users is only 33%. With regard to the prevalence of fast food restaurant, it is 30% among 
user communities versus only 10% among non-user communities.  
Summary statistics are shown in Table 3a and 3b. Table 3a is the male subsample 
for the analysis of smoking and drinking. There are total 1521 person-year observations 
for smoking analysis and 1524 observations for drinking analysis. Computer users have 
higher prevalence rates of drinking and lower rates of smoking compared with non-users. 
Among the total male subsample, 33 percent of youth use computers in a typical week, 
including one half in internet cafés only, one fourth at home only, and another one fourth 
in both settings. The average computer use time among male youth 15-30 years old is 
5.38 hours/wk. For the user subsample, the average time spent in front of computer 
monitor is as high as 16.74 hours/wk. Computer users tend to be younger; are less likely 
to be minorities; are more likely to be high school or college graduates; and are more 
likely to live in urban areas with smaller household size and higher per-capita household 
income. The communities where computer users reside are more accessible to fast food 
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restaurants and cable TV. Apparently, computer users spend more hours engaging in 
screen-based sedentary activities such as watching TV, DVDs and videogames. The total 
screen hours (TV + DVD + video game) for computer users are 17.75 hours/wk 
compared with 16.35 hours/wk for non-users. In terms of the various components of food 
energy intakes, computer users tend to consume food with higher fat and protein, and 
lower carbohydrate.  
 Table 3b reports the whole sample for the analysis of obesity, overweight, 
underweight and self-reported poor health status. Computer users on average have lower 
obesity rates but significantly higher rates of underweight and self-reported poor health. 
Among all the youth aged 15-30, 28 percent use computers in a typical week, including 
1/2 in café only, 1/4 at home only, and another ¼ in both settings. The general 
characteristics for the personal, household, and community variables are very similar to 
those in the male subsample.  
 
3.5 Empirical Framework 
This section will present all the analyses I employed to explore the association between 
computer use and health outcomes among adolescents and youth.  
The basic empirical specification is: 
ihjtitihjtihjtihjt provinceXeComputerUsHealth   210         (1) 
 
Where the dependent variable Healthihjt is dichotomous with a value of 1 if the youth i in 
the household h and community j at time t is under certain health condition, and with a 
value of zero otherwise. I have six health indicators, namely smoking, drinking, obesity, 
overweight, underweight and self-reporting poor health.  For each of these six indicators, 
a value of one represents a bad health outcome for the individual. I will run six separate 
regressions with these six different binary dependent variables. The key variable of 
interest is ComputerUseihjt, which measures the computer use situation of person i in 
household h and community j at time t. The coefficient α1 is the estimate of the health 
effect of computer use. Xihjt includes a set of covariates, including individual’s age, age 
square, gender, educational status, minority status, whether in school, whether working, 
urban residency, household size, logarithm of per capita household gross income, 
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community-level fast food restaurant indicator and cable TV indicator. Province is a set 
of provincial dummies, controlling for the location-specific fixed effects which may 
affect health outcomes both directly and indirectly. τt is an indicator for time trend, which 
will incorporate the national trends affecting youth health, such as school education in 
diet habit, advertisement on body shape image, and other macro-level factors. μi is 
individual-level fixed effect which accounts for the time-invariant unobserved individual 
characteristics. δihjt captures the idiosyncratic errors. For all the specifications, I estimate 
the coefficients with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the community 
level.  The advantage using the clustered robust standard errors is that they do not change 
the point estimates of the coefficients but often generate larger standard errors. As a 
result, the likelihood for an estimate being statistically significant is reduced and we can 
have more accurate results.  
 To test whether the health effects are persistent and robust, I use all the possible 
specifications, including pooled ordinary least square (OLS), and fixed effects (FE). I 
will discuss these models in details. The consistency of OLS model requires the error 
term to be i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed), which is often violated in the 
real world. The FE model holds constant the average effects of each individual, and can 
control for the average differences across individuals in any observable or unobservable 
predictors. In general, the FE model produces more reliable point estimates and I will 
primarily rely on the fixed effects estimates for interpretation.  
 As discussed earlier, I am especially interested in exploring the health effect of 
computer use in internet cafés, where parental supervision is missing. Thus, I distinguish 
computer use into three types - in café only, at home only, and in both settings. It is 
expected that computer use in internet café produces the most serious health 
consequences. I revise the equation (1) as below:  
ihjtitihjt
ihjtihjtihjtihjt
provinceX
eComputerbothComputercafeComputerHealth




4
3210 hom___
 
                                                       (2) 
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Where computer_café ihjt is computer use hours only in cafés, computer_homeihjt is 
computer use hours only at home-based setting, and computer_bothihjt is computer use 
hours in both settings.  α1 is the parameter of interest. 
 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Impacts of Computer Use on Youth Health 
 Table 4 presents the effect of computer use on the likelihood of smoking and 
drinking among males 15-30 years old in three settings. In the two models on the left 
with smoking as the outcome variable, computer use appears to increase the probability 
of smoking. The estimate for the café use is 0.004 in OLS model and 0.008 in FE model, 
all being positive and statistically significant, whereas the FE estimates for computer use 
at home and both settings are all insignificant. The FE estimate specifies that each hour of 
computer access in internet café can increase the probability of smoking by 0.8 
percentage points. The OLS regression coefficient is underestimated by half in magnitude, 
suggesting that the bias is driven by unobservable traits of the café user. Given the 
average computer use hours shown in Figure 2
2
, the café-only computer access can lead 
to an increase in the probability of smoking by 9.46% on a weekly base.  
Still in Table 4, the two regressions on the right are the various estimates on the 
drinking behavior. None of the coefficients for café use is statistically significant 
compared with both OLS and FE coefficients for home use having statistical significance. 
This distinct pattern for drinking behavior between café users and non-café users may 
reflect social norms that Chinese households tolerate alcoholic beverages at home.  
The coefficient estimates of control variables are stable across specifications, both 
in terms of the signs and magnitudes. Age is a strong predictor for smoking and drinking 
behavior, and age effects turn out to be non-linear and quadratic. Compared with the 
reference group (elementary education or below), youth with higher educational 
attainment have a lower incidence of smoking and drinking. Household size and 
residency location don’t affect health behavior. Income is positively associated with 
                                                          
2
 Figure 2, the average computer use hours per week is 11.84 hours for café only, 18.89 hours for both 
settings, and 11.27 hours for home only, respectively.  
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drinking alcohol and the OLS coefficient estimate is statistically significant. None of the 
two community-level variables appear to have effects on smoking and drinking. 
Provincial dummies are included in the regressions but the coefficients are not shown 
here in order to save space. Only two out of eight provincial dummies are statistically 
significant. It turns out that the two provinces are the most populous administrative 
regions in China.  
Next, I turn to the regression results for the outcome of obesity, overweight, 
underweight and self-reported poor health, which may reflect the actual physical health 
of individuals. Table 5 finds a lack of association between BMI-based indicators and 
computer use except that home computer use predicts a positive incidence of overweight. 
With self-reported poor health as the health outcome, both the OLS and FE coefficient 
estimates for computer use in café are statistically significant, indicating that café is not a 
pleasant environment for youth health. Café users have a rate of self-reported poor health 
status 0.7 percent higher than computer users in other settings. With the average weekly 
café use hours equal to 11.84, the FE estimate predicts that going to internet café can 
raise the rate of self-reported poor health by the probability of 8.3%.  
 
3.6.2 Mechanisms: Screen Based Sedentary Activity and Dietary Energy Intake 
 Results from reduced-form models have suggested that computer use in internet 
café has adverse health consequence in terms of smoking and self-reported poor health. 
There is no association between computer use and obesity/underweight regardless of the 
environment. The home-only computer access, not café-only access, predicts a 
prevalence of overweight. To help explain these results, I turn to time use and dietary 
energy intake data. Specially, I want to test whether the computer effect on health is 
caused by long hours of screen time, or through changes in youth’s dietary energy intake.  
 The three panels of Table 6 report the regression results after I replace the 
dependent variable in equation (2) with total screen-based media hours. I define two 
different variations of screen time: (1) the total hours watching TV in Panel A; (2) the 
sum of total hours watching TV, DVD, and video games in Panel B. Based on the 
hypothesis from the conceptual model in Section 3, the computer may change users’ 
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lifestyle by increasing their screen-based physical inactivity hours. Panel A of Table 6 
shows the OLS effect of café use on watching TV, indicative that each hour of café use 
can raise the TV viewing time by 0.07 hours (4.2 minutes). This association disappears in 
the FE model. Panel B of Table 6 displays that both OLS and FE estimates are positive 
and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, with each hour of café use increasing the 
total screen time (TV + DVD + video) by 0.17 hours (10.3 minutes). These results may 
reflect that computer use in café may be complementary to the aggregated effect of these 
three types of screen-based physical inactivity.  
As mentioned in Section 4, I cannot resolve the double counting problem when 
counting hours playing DVD and video game. It is possible that viewers watch DVD and 
play video games either on TV screen or on computer monitor. The questionnaires don’t 
provide enough information to identify the exact location of these activities. My analysis 
is based on the assumption that hours displaying DVD and video are independent of 
hours watching TV and using computer. Therefore, my findings here should be 
interpreted with caution.  
 Since longer computer hours in café are accompanied by longer hours of watching 
TV, DVD and video, I am curious whether computer hours in café reduce the total 
physical activity hours (dance, track, swim, badminton, volleyball, soccer, basketball, 
table tennis, etc). Panel A (Table 7) reports the regression coefficients in the equation 
with total physical activity hours as the dependent variable. Surprisingly, there is no 
association between computer use in café and total physical activity hours. Since the time 
endowment is fixed for each individual, I further explore the relationship between total 
physical activity hours and total computer hours/TV hours/screen time in order to 
discover the structure of time use among these adolescents and youth. The OLS estimate 
in Panel B (Table 7) presents a positive association between total computer use hours and 
total physical activity hours, namely that every computer use hour can increase the total 
physical activity hour by 2 minutes. The OLS estimate in Panel C (Table 7) shows a 
negative association between watching TV and total physical activity, with each 
television viewing hour leading to a reduction in physical hours by 2 minutes. Apparently, 
these two OLS estimates take the opposite signs and so offset each other, indicating that 
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computer use and television watching together may have little impact on total physical 
activity hours. However, this relationship doesn’t exist in the FE model. Panel D (Table 7) 
reports a lack of association between total screen-based media hours (TV + DVD + video 
+ computer) and total physical time, possibly due to individuals allocating time to 
different kinds of screen-based activities.  
 Table 8 shows the effect of computer use on daily dietary intakes. Each time, I 
replace the dependent variable in equations (2) with one of the four food intake variables 
– the natural logarithm of total daily calorie consumption, the share of carbohydrate, the 
share of fat, and the share of protein in total calorie. There is no clear pattern between 
computer use and daily calorie consumption/carbohydrate/protein regardless of the 
location getting access to computer. However, café use predicts a positive incidence of 
fat consumption. The result in the fixed effect regression shows that each café hour can 
increase the share of fat in daily food consumption by 15%. The FE estimate is 
informative in terms of understanding different dietary intakes associated with computer 
use.  
Lastly, I don’t have enough information to conclude that one regression result is 
more reliable than others. However, if both the sign and magnitudes from OLS//FE 
models are stable and robust, I can rely on the fixed effects estimates for the final 
interpretation.  
 
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper explores the relationship between computer use in internet cafés and 
health outcomes among adolescents and youth by using the longitudinal dataset created 
by the China Health and Nutrition Survey. Results from the fixed effects regressions 
suggest that every hour spent in internet cafés can increase the likelihood of smoking by 
roughly 0.8 percent, and the probability of self-reported poor health by 0.7 percent. On a 
weekly basis, these two effects magnify to become 9.46% and 8.3%, respectively. Such 
relationships don’t exist for computer access at home or in both settings. In addition, 
computer access in cafés seems to transform patterns of food consumption, causing a 15 
percent increase in the share of fat to total calorie consumption. There is no association 
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between computer use and obesity/underweight regardless of the environment. Computer 
use at home turns out to be a strong predictor for overweight.  
I propose two types of mechanisms to explain the observable association between 
computer use in cafés and various adverse health outcomes. One is lifestyle effects. Here 
I test the hypothesis that computer use in café is a strong predictor of sedentary screen 
hours. With the potential double counting problem, my findings for this result should be 
interpreted with caution. Both the OLS/FE coefficient estimates suggest that computer 
use in cafés is positively associated with longer screen viewing hours (TV + DVD + 
video), whereas there is no such relationship among users in other settings. However, 
both television viewing and computer use have no impact on total physical activity hours.  
Youth engage in many activities every day. It is possible that the dynamics among 
computer use, television watching and physical activity is accompanied by a modification 
of the time allocated to other activities such as reading, walking and sleeping. 
The other mechanism is that of social network effects. Peer effects in internet café 
environments are everywhere- watching the same webpage, playing the same computer 
games, smoking simultaneously, eating the same food and drinking the same beverage. 
With the detailed information about daily dietary intakes available, I test the hypothesis 
whether computer use in café is strongly associated with distinct eating habits among 
café users and other types of users. The regression results confirm that café users 
consume food with a higher fraction of fat content. This lack of nutrition may be the 
possible reason for poor health. Combining results from different health regressions, it is 
possible that the poor health among café users is caused by smoking (or second-hand 
smoking) and eating high-fat food.  
The empirical results from the FE estimation should be viewed as suggestive. 
Since the FE estimation predicts the association between changes in the key independent 
variables and changes in health outcomes net of observed and unobserved invariable 
characteristics of the computer user, it is an improvement over the classic OLS model. 
However, it should be borne in mind that FE estimates do not resolve all of the causality 
problems associated with observable data. For instance, if youth who are physically weak 
are more prone to screen-based activities, my analysis will suffer from the bias of reverse 
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causality, namely that pre-existing differences in health outcomes may produce different 
propensities to use computers. An ideal instrumental variable approach would be a 
solution.  
My study has three implications for global health policy. First, lack of parental 
supervision is not good for adolescents’ health, and an increase in parental involvement 
in after-school activities is crucial. Good educational materials on the perils of 
uncontrolled internet café usage should be widely distributed and studied. Since many 
Chinese parents in the rural communities travel away from home and work as migrant 
workers in the cities, this issue becomes more severe for those who remain in rural areas. 
Second, effective policies should be in place to help internet cafes to become health-
promoting environments. In many parts of the country, those illegal internet cafés lure 
customers by offering low prices and twenty-four hour access. Heavy fines are not the 
only solution to eliminating these poorly-operated cafés. The more constructive strategy 
is to enact effective policies on internet café operation that can be implemented on a daily 
basis. One example might be a nationwide campaign to restrict smoking inside  internet 
cafés. Third, my study highlights the need for joint efforts to establish effective health 
policy to reduce negative health outcomes. Parents, school teachers and internet café 
operators are not the only stakeholders.  
Despite these caveats, my research can make a contribution to the literature by 
documenting how computer access in internet cafés affects youth health in the global 
context. Extensive internet use is a phenomenon not only in China, but also in many 
emerging markets such as India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, among others. Although 
there are country-specific policies in place regulating internet cafés, the policy 
implications derived from this study of Chinese youth shed light on problems and 
possibilities that are common to many developing nations.  
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Computer Use by Age (Hours vs. Frequency) 
Panel A:  Average Computer Use Hours by Age 
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Panel B: Percentage of Computer Usage by Age 
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Figure 3.2: Average Screen-Based Media Use Hours by Location 
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Computer Use Hours by Location and Frequency 
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Table 3.1: Data Structure 
Variable 
list  
2004only 2006only Stay in Both 
waves 
Stay in Both waves 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 %(status 
==1) 
N %(status 
==1) 
N %(status 
==1) 
N No change 
of 
status(%) 
No→Yes 
(%) 
Yes→No 
(%) 
       Stayer Enterer Leaver 
Computer 
use 0/1 
22.11 909 42.01 607 28.85 766 85.25 11.36 3.39 
          
Computer in 
café 0/1 
10.89 909 18.28 607 12.53 766 87.82 7.14 5.05 
          
Computer 
use both in 
café and at 
home 
3.63 909 10.54 607 6.40 766 92.32 4.85 2.83 
          
Computer at 
home 0/1  
7.59 909 13.18 607 9.92 766 88.10 7.89 4.00 
          
Smoking 0/1 34.64 485 42.94 326 38.17 524 82.25 10.88 6.87 
          
Drinking 
0/1 
38.60 487 49.38 324 45.82 526 74.52 17.68 7.79 
          
Obesity 0/1 3.10 871 3.38 650 3.27 888 96.73 1.91 1.35 
          
Overweight 
0/1 
8.84 871 13.69 650 11.04 888 88.74 5.41 5.86 
          
Underweight 
0/1 
12.86 871 10.46 650 12.27 888 87.05 5.52 7.43 
          
Poor health 
0/1 
20.48 913 18.74 651 23.21 1034 69.63 14.70 15.67 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Community-level Characteristics by Computer Use 
 Overall  Using 
Compute
r  
Not 
Using 
Compute
r 
t-test 
(p-
value) 
Variable list (1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)
-(3) 
Population of neighborhood 3671.51 5082.99 2928.29 .00 
# of household in neighborhood 1028.24 1499.03 846.30 .00 
Area of neighborhood (sq.km) 17.43 20.27 15.91 .30 
Daily wage of ordinary male workers (yuan) 26.34 29.26 25.18 .00 
Daily wage of ordinary female workers 
(yuan) 
20.85 24.10 19.54 .00 
Monthly wage of driver (yuan) 1161.03 1309.07 1100.49 .00 
Distance to primary school(km) 1.26 .95 1.40 .00 
Distance to middle school(km) 2.24 1.58 2.47 .00 
Distance to high school(km) 6.44   3.80 7.32 .00 
Whether road is paved? .68 .79 .64 .00 
Whether electricity cutoff sometime during 
the week? 
.14 .09 .16 .00 
Whether there is internet service in the 
neighborhood? 
.51 .72 .43 .00 
Whether there is internet café in the 
neighborhood? 
.42 .67 .33 .00 
Whether there is fast food restaurant in 
the neighborhood? 
.16 .30 .10 .00 
N communities 366 159 207  
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Table 3.3a- Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Health Behavior Outcome 
Regression (Only Males Aged 15-30 yrs old) 
Y=smoking /Y=drinking 
 All  Using 
Compute
r 
 Not 
Using 
Compute
r 
 
Variable List N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Ys:       
0/1 smoking 1521 .39 499 .38 1022 .41 
0/1 drinking 1524 .44 498 .46 1026 .43 
       
Computer-related 
variables 
      
0/1 Computer use 1527 .33 500 1.00 1027 0 
0/1 Computer use in café  1527 .16 500 .50 1027 0 
0/1 Computer use in both 
locations  
1527 .08 500 .23 1027 0 
0/1 Computer use at home 1527 .09 500 .27 1027 0 
       
Screen-based Media Use 
Hours 
      
Avg computer use hrs/wk 1527 5.38 500 16.74 1027 0 
Avg TV hrs/wk 1369 14.29 459 14.13 910 14.38 
Avg DVD+Video hrs/wk  456 9.07 218 9.61 238 8.58 
Avg TV+DVD+Video hrs/wk  1369 16.83 459 17.75 910 16.35 
       
Food Energy Intake       
Calorie/day 1515 2321.57 495 2318.01 1020 2323.30 
Share of Carbohydrate 
(%) 
1515 61.03 495 56.02 1020 63.46 
Share of Fat (%) 1515 26.80 495 30.94 1020 24.80 
Share of Protein (%) 1515 12.16 495 13.03 1020 11.74 
       
Xs:       
Age 1527 23.18 500 21.86 1027 23.83 
Age squared 1527 565.73 500 501.05 1027 597.23 
Male 1527 1.00 500 1.00 1027 1.00 
Minority 1527 .13 500 .06 1027 .16 
Educ: elementary or 
below 
1524 .10 500 .02 1024 .13 
Educ: lower secondary 
school 
1524 .51 500 .31 1024 .61 
Educ: high school or 
equivalent 
1524 .32 500 .47 1024 .24 
Educ: bachelor or above 1524 .08 500 .20 1024 .02 
Urban 1527 .24 500 .43 1027 .15 
Household size 1508 4.23 495 3.90 1013 4.39 
HH income gross  
(CPI-adjusted) 
1506 
 
29330.1
6 
495 
 
37482.9
3 
1011 
 
25338.4
5 
HH income per person 
(CPI-adjusted) 
1508 6436.14 495 9321.65 1013 5026.14 
Community-whether 
 fast food restaurant?  
1517 .16 500 .28 1017 .09 
Community-whether 
 cable TV?  
1522 .68 499 .85 1023 .59 
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Table 3.3b- Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Health Outcome Regression  
(Both Males and Females Aged 15-30)   
Y=obesity/Y=overweight/Y=underweight/Y=poor health  
 All  Using 
Computer 
  Not 
Using 
Computer 
 
Variable List N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Ys:       
0/1 obesity 2650 .03 758 .03 1892 .04 
0/1 overweight 2650 .11 758 .11 1892 .11 
0/1 underweight 2650 .12 758 .18 1892 .10 
0/1 poor health 2924 .22 812 .23 2112 .21 
       
Computer-related variables       
0/1 Computer use 2943 .28 817 1.00 2126 0 
0/1 Computer use in café  2943 .13 817 .46 2126 0 
0/1 Computer use in both 
locations  
2943 .06 817 .22 2126 0 
0/1 Computer use at home 2943 .09 817 .33 2126 0 
       
Screen-based Media Use 
Hours 
      
Avg computer use hrs/wk 2928 4.05 802 14.80 2126 0 
Avg TV hrs/wk 2656 14.43 760 13.78 1896 14.70 
Avg DVD+Video hrs/wk  714 8.45 314 8.80 400 8.18 
Avg TV+DVD+Video hrs/wk  2656 16.69 760 17.39 1896 16.41 
       
Food Energy Intake       
Calorie/day 2885 2140.69 802 2148.43 2083 2137.71 
Share of Carbohydrate (%) 2883 60.19 801 54.87 2082 62.24 
Share of Fat (%) 2883 27.59 801 31.85 2082 25.95 
Share of Protein (%) 2883 12.21 801 13.28 2082 11.81 
       
Xs:       
Age 2943 23.54 817 21.94 2126 24.15 
Age squared 2943 581.94 817 505.24 2126 611.42 
Male 2943 .52 817 .62 2126 .48 
Minority 2943 .13 817 .06 2126 .15 
Educ: elementary or below 2938 .12 817 .01 2121 .16 
Educ: lower secondary 
school 
2938 .49 817 .27 2121 .58 
Educ: high school or 
equivalent 
2938 .30 817   .46 2121 .24 
Educ: bachelor or above 2938 .09 817 .27 2121 .02 
Urban 2943 .24 817 .44 2126 .17 
Household size 2909 4.32 809 3.91 2100 4.48 
HH income gross  
(CPI-adjusted) 
2906 29025.98 809 37799.81 2097 25641.13 
HH income per person  
(CPI-adjusted) 
2909 6294.82 809 9551.36 2100 5040.29 
Community-whether 
 fast food restaurant? 
2918 .16 815 .30 2103 .10 
Community-whether 
 cable TV? 
2929 .68 814 .87 2115 .60 
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Table 3.4: Estimating the Relationship between Computer Use (in Internet Café vs. NOT 
in Internet Café) and the Probability of Smoking and/ or Drinking among Adolescents 
and Youths. 
(Only Males Aged 15-30; CHNS 2004-2006) 
 Y= 
Smoking 
 Y= 
Drinking 
 
Variables OLS FE OLS FE 
Computer hrs/wk in café only 0.004 0.008 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.001) (0.004) 
Computer hrs/wk both in café and 
at home 
0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002)* (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Computer hrs/wk at home only 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.010 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)** (0.004)* 
Total screen hours (TV+DVD+VIDEO) -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) 
Age 0.111 0.005 0.100 0.212 
 (0.031)** (0.078) (0.032)** (0.097)* 
Age squared -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)* (0.002) 
Minority -0.001  0.148  
 (0.049)  (0.050)**  
Marital status 0.026 0.161 0.097 -0.026 
 (0.043) (0.114) (0.044)* (0.101) 
Whether in school? -0.186 -0.135 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.042)** (0.095) (0.046) (0.106) 
Whether working? 0.037 0.169 0.076 0.004 
 (0.041) (0.057)** (0.039) (0.072) 
Education: middle school -0.070 -0.175 0.070 -0.176 
 (0.049) (0.246) (0.044) (0.137) 
Education: high school or 
equivalent 
-0.128 -0.281 0.031 -0.402 
 (0.054)* (0.274) (0.052) (0.184)* 
Education: bachelor or above -0.190 -0.254 0.027 -0.467 
 (0.073)* (0.326) (0.070) (0.214)* 
Household size 0.008 -0.050 -0.010 -0.020 
 (0.012) (0.033) (0.012) (0.033) 
Log(income) 0.013 -0.033 0.018 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.008)* (0.022) 
Urban site -0.007  0.017  
 (0.035)  (0.042)  
Community-any fastfood 0.109 0.103 0.086 0.068 
 (0.042)* (0.076) (0.051) (0.092) 
Community-cable TV -0.011 -0.011 -0.035 -0.079 
 (0.031) (0.041) (0.034) (0.062) 
year2006 -0.014  0.049  
 (0.023)  (0.026)  
Provincial dummies YES NO YES NO 
Constant -1.081 0.840 -1.307 -2.376 
 (0.371)** (0.979) (0.390)** (1.200)* 
Observations 1375 1375 1355 1355 
R-squared 0.21 0.12 0.17 0.09 
# of persons  1095  1086 
F-test βcafé=βhome:     
P-value  .0005 .0047 .0321 .0228 
Robust standard errors in brackets  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.5: Estimating the Relationship between Computer Use and the Probability of 
Being Obese, Overweight, Underweight or Being in Self-Reported Poor Health among 
Adolescents and Youths. 
(Both Males and Females Aged 15-30; CHNS 2004-2006) 
Panel A   
 Y=Obesity   
Variables OLS FE 
Computer hrs/wk in café only 0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Computer hrs/wk both in café and at 
home 
0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Computer hrs/wk at home only -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Controls YES YES 
Panel B   
 Y=Overweight  
Variables OLS FE 
Computer hrs/wk in café only -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Computer hrs/wk both in café and at 
home 
0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Computer hrs/wk at home only 0.001 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.003)* 
Controls YES YES 
Panel C   
 Y=Underweight  
Variables OLS FE 
Computer hrs/wk in café only 0.001 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Computer hrs/wk both in café and at 
home 
-0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001)** (0.002) 
Computer hrs/wk at home only 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Controls YES YES 
Panel D   
 Y=Poor health  
Variables OLS FE 
Computer hrs/wk in café only 0.003 0.007 
 (0.001)* (0.002)** 
Computer hrs/wk both in café and at 
home 
-0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
Computer hrs/wk at home only 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 2608 2608 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 
# of person  2077 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.6: Mechanism (1) - Estimating the Relationship between Computer Use and 
Screen-Based Media Hours  
(Both Males and Females Aged 15-30, CHNS 2004-2006) 
 
Panel A: Y=total hours of watching TV (1 items) 
 Y=total(TV)  
   
Variables OLS FE 
Computer hrs/wk in café only 0.073 -0.069 
 (0.028)** (0.064) 
Computer hrs/wk both in café and at 
home 
-0.016 -0.014 
 (0.029) (0.052) 
Computer hrs/wk at home only 0.101 0.020 
 (0.056) (0.058) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 2569 2569 
R-squared 0.14 0.05 
# of person  2056 
 
Panel B:  Y=total hours of watching TV, DVD, and VIDEO GAME (3 items) 
 Y=total(TV + DVD + VIDEO) 
   
Variables OLS FE 
Computer hrs/wk in café only 0.171 0.166 
 (0.047)** (0.080)* 
Computer hrs/wk both in café and at 
home 
-0.001 0.056 
 (0.037) (0.074) 
Computer hrs/wk at home only 0.050 0.117 
 (0.040) (0.084) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 2619 2619 
R-squared 0.13 0.05 
# of person  2085 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.7: Estimating the Relationship between Screen-Based Media Hours and Physical 
Activity Hours  
(Both Males and Females Aged 15-30, CHNS 2004-2006) 
 
Panel A: Y=total physical activity hours 
Variables OLS FE 
Computer hrs/wk in café only 0.066 0.007 
 (0.035) (0.028) 
Computer hrs/wk both in café and at 
home 
0.011 0.027 
 (0.014) (0.030) 
Computer hrs/wk at home only 0.043 -0.022 
 (0.034) (0.021) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 2507 2507 
R-squared 0.20 0.11 
# of person  1969 
 
Panel B:   Y=total physical activity hours 
Variables OLS FE 
Total Computer Hours Per Week 0.031 0.025 
 (0.010)** (0.019) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 2507 2507 
R-squared 0.30 0.11 
# of person  1969 
 
Panel C:   Y=total physical activity hours 
Variables OLS FE 
Total TV Hours Per Week -0.026 -0.006 
 (0.008)** (0.011) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 2596 2596 
R-squared 0.30 0.12 
# of person  2030 
 
Panel D:   Y=total physical activity hours 
Variables OLS FE 
Total Screen Hours Per Week 
(TV+DVD+VIDEO+COMPUTER) 
0.007 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.011) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 2611 2611 
R-squared 0.30 0.10 
# of person  2040 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.8: Mechanism (2) – Estimating the Relationship between Computer Use and 
Food Energy Intake  
(Both Males and Females Aged 15-30, CHNS 2004-2006) 
Panel A:  Y= 
Log(Calorie/day) 
 
Variables OLS FE 
Computer hrs/wk in café only -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Computer hrs/wk both in café and at 
home 
0.000 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Computer hrs/wk at home only -0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Controls YES YES 
   
 
Panel B: Y=  
Share of Carbohydrates in total 
calories 
Computer hrs/wk in café only -0.055 -0.026 
 (0.034) (0.052) 
Computer hrs/wk both in café and at 
home 
0.010 0.234 
 (0.037) (0.072)** 
Computer hrs/wk at home only -0.061 0.002 
 (0.033) (0.097) 
Controls YES YES 
   
 
Panel C:  Y=  
Share of Fat in total calories 
Computer hrs/wk in café only 0.078 0.151 
 (0.033)* (0.049)** 
Computer hrs/wk both in Café and at 
home 
-0.025 -0.122 
 (0.036) (0.056)* 
Computer hrs/wk at home only 0.061 -0.069 
 (0.032) (0.114) 
Controls YES YES 
   
 
Panel D: Y=  
Share of Protein in total calories 
Computer hrs/wk in café only 0.004 -0.019 
 (0.009) (0.021) 
Computer hrs/wk both in Café and at 
home 
0.031 0.003 
 (0.010)** (0.018) 
Computer hrs/wk at home only 0.017 -0.027 
 (0.011) (0.029) 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 2785 2785 
R-squared 0.14 0.04 
# of person  2198 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Chapter 4 
Unemployment Insurance and Low-Educated, Single, Working Mothers before and after 
Welfare Reform 
 
4.1 Introduction 
During the 1990s, low-educated single mothers left cash welfare and increased 
their labor force participation at unprecedented rates (Blank, 2006). Several factors 
contributed to these dramatic changes: the 1996 welfare reform, the expansion of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and the economic expansion of the late 1990s 
(Ellwood, 2000; Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001). An important question is the extent to 
which increased work effort by low-educated, single mothers, and their subsequent 
experience of job loss, caused increases in the rate at which they receive unemployment 
insurance (UI). 
The purpose of UI is to protect against the loss of income during involuntary 
unemployment. However, literature finds that low-wage workers often experience 
difficulties accessing the program (Vroman 1998; Levine, 2006; Wenger 2006; Shaefer 
2010). The current study examines UI use patterns among low-educated, single, working 
mothers who enter a spell of unemployment. It explores the extent to which those 
patterns changed in the years after enactment of the 1996 welfare reform. It also 
examines changes in the use of two other major income support programs: cash welfare 
and the Food Stamp Program (FSP, now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program, or SNAP). This study asks whether the growth in labor force participation 
among low-educated, single mothers since the early 1990s is accompanied by growth in 
UI eligibility and receipt among this population. It further asks whether the relative 
importance of three major income support programs (UI, the FSP, and cash welfare) 
changed for single mothers who enter a spell of unemployment. 
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Most of the ensuing analyses compare UI program participation outcomes for 
low-educated, single mothers with those for low-educated, single, childless women. The 
comparison is a rough control for competing explanatory factors that similarly affect both 
groups of women. Use of the comparison helps the study to evaluate whether any change 
in the UI participation of single mothers might be attributed to welfare reform and to 
changes in related social welfare policies, rather than to other trends (Eissa and Liebman 
1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Meyer & Sullivan 2004).  
 
4.2 Background & Contribution 
Most research on UI benefits receipt by vulnerable workers explores the 
importance of one or more of three key factors: monetary eligibility, non-monetary 
eligibility, and take-up of benefits (Bassi and McMurrer 1997; Levine, 2006; O’Leary & 
Kline, 2008; Vroman 2009; Shaefer 2010). Each of these factors is believed to be a 
barrier to receiving UI benefits. 
The requirements for monetary eligibility vary from one state to another. 
Generally, workers must earn a state-specific minimum of $1000-$3000 over 4 quarters 
(referred to as the base period) from any qualifying employer in order to be eligible for 
UI benefits. Many states also limit UI eligibility to those workers whose earnings exceed 
a minimum level within a single quarter, referred to as a high-quarter requirement. Until 
recently, the standard base period used by most states was the first 4 of the previous 5 
completed quarters, and thus, earnings from the most recent completed quarter were 
excluded from eligibility calculations. By excluding earnings from the quarter of job loss 
and the most recent completed quarter, the standard base period results in long lags 
between the point of job loss and the earnings that can be included in eligibility 
calculations. A growing number of states have adopted alternative base periods, which 
allow workers to include earnings from their most recent completed quarter in the 
calculation of eligibility.
1
 The goal of an alternative base period is to increase the 
likelihood that low-wage workers (who often have short or sporadic work histories) will 
meet monetary eligibility requirements (Boushey and Wenger 2006; Wenger 2006). 
                                                 
1
 Many of these states adopted an alternative base period in response to monetary incentives included in the 
UI Modernization Act, which was part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 
(123 Stat. 115). 
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Some recent studies find, however, that rates of monetary eligibility are already high 
among vulnerable workers (Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson 2002; Rangarajan 
and Razaﬁndrakoto 2004; O’Leary and Kline 2008; Shaefer 2010). Such findings suggest 
that monetary eligibility is not the primary factor driving low levels of UI receipt among 
vulnerable populations. 
Several nonmonetary requirements limit eligibility to receive UI benefits. Most of 
these relate to the circumstances surrounding a worker’s job separation. Such 
circumstances include the reason for job loss and also professed availability for future 
employment. To be eligible to receive UI benefits, workers typically must leave 
employment due to layoff, plant closing, or some other involuntary reason, and the 
separation must not be a result of a voluntary quit or discharge by the employer for work. 
In a few states, workers who do not meet nonmonetary requirements initially may later 
become eligible. Further, some states have provisions that allow workers to maintain 
eligibility if they quit voluntarily but are able to show that they have a good cause for 
doing so. Examples of good-cause reasons include leaving employment to care for an ill 
or disabled family member, to escape domestic violence, and to accompany a spouse who 
relocates for employment. A number of studies suggest that nonmonetary requirements 
may be a greater barrier to UI access than monetary requirements for vulnerable workers 
(Holzer 2000; Rangarajan et al. 2002; Rangarajan and Razaﬁndrakoto 2004; O’Leary & 
Kline, 2008; Shaefer 2010). Across these studies, workers had low rates of nonmonetary 
ineligibility. Low rates of nonmonetary ineligibility may be due in part to the 
characteristics of the industries in which jobs for these workers are clustered. Low-wage 
workers are disproportionately employed in industries that tend to avoid formal lay-offs 
(U.S. General Accounting Office 2000; Lambert 2008). 
Take-up is another factor that may affect receipt of UI benefits. Vulnerable 
unemployed workers who are eligible for UI may be less likely to take up UI benefits 
than eligible unemployed workers who are more advantaged. Using data from the 2001 
panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), H. Luke Shaefer (2010) 
finds that eligible workers in the lowest wage quintile are less likely to participate in UI 
than are higher-paid eligible workers. Analyzing supplements from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS), Stephen Wandner and Andrew Stettner 
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(2000) report that more than half of the unemployed do not file for UI. The most common 
reason cited is perceived ineligibility.  
Low-educated Single Mothers, Labor Force Participation, and UI Participation 
 Labor force participation increased substantially among single mothers in the 
1990s. Most studies conclude that this was due to a combination of reasons, including the 
1996 welfare reform, expansions of the EITC, increases to the minimum wage, and the 
booming economy of the 1990s (Dickert, Houser, and Scholz 1995; Eissa and Liebman 
1996; Ellwood 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Hotz and Scholz 2003; Blank 2006; 
Dahl, DeLeire and Schwabish 2009). The EITC expansions and the 1996 welfare reform 
fundamentally changed anti-poverty policy by raising the benefits of work while ending 
the entitlement to cash assistance. 
These changes also led to a dramatic decline in the number of single-mother 
families receiving cash assistance. Caseloads of cash assistance through Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and then Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) declined from 11.7 million individuals in 1990 to 4.5 million in 2005 (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families 
n.d.). What is unknown is whether single mothers entering a spell of unemployment 
experienced growing access to UI during this period. In facing unemployment spells 
before welfare reform and the broad changes of the 1990s, did low-educated, single 
mothers use cash assistance instead of UI? If so, have policy changes prompted low-
educated, single mothers to stop using cash assistance at such times? Most important, if 
access to cash assistance declined for single mothers entering a spell of unemployment 
during the study period (1990-2005), did their probability of accessing UI increase?  
 Julia Isaacs (2005) uses CPS data to document growth in UI receipt among low-
income, single, female household heads with related resident children during the early 
recession years of 2001-2003. She finds that the growth in the proportion of this 
population accessing UI exceeds the increase in participation rates during the recession of 
the early 1990s, and she concludes that this growth partially explains why TANF 
caseloads declined during the 2001 recession. However, she does not specifically 
examine the UI participation rates of single mothers entering a spell of unemployment, 
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nor does she use a comparison group to rule out the importance of other factors apart 
from the major social policy changes. 
In a study that analyzes recent administrative data from four major states, 
Christopher O’Leary and Kenneth Kline (2008) examine UI use by individuals who left 
TANF for employment, lost a job and then applied for UI. They find that 90 percent of 
these individuals are monetarily eligible for UI. However, welfare leavers in these states 
are far less likely than other applicants to meet nonmonetary eligibility requirements. The 
authors attribute the difference between the groups to higher rates of voluntary job quits 
and dismissals among the job leavers. Two other studies find that a large majority of 
former welfare recipients meet monetary eligibility requirements; both find that 
nonmonetary requirements are a greater eligibility barrier than the monetary requirements 
(Rangarajan et al. 2002; Rangarajan and Razaﬁndrakoto 2004). These studies examine 
relatively short periods of time and do not use nationally representative samples. 
Heather Boushey and Jeffrey Wenger (2006) use data from the 1993 and 1996 
panels of the SIPP. They find that women ages 18-64 who left welfare and reported 
earnings during the SIPP panel in which they participated were less likely to meet 
monetary requirements in the late 1990s than they were in the early 1990s. However, 
Boushey and Wenger (2006) do not look at the probability of UI receipt or use a 
comparison group approach. Further, although examining recent welfare leavers offers 
important information, it is also important to examine the broader sample of single 
mothers, not just recent welfare recipients, because the population of welfare leavers has 
undergone large compositional changes over time (Meyer and Sullivan 2004).
2
 These 
selection effects may impact estimates in important ways.  
Contribution of the Current Study 
To the authors’ knowledge, the current study is the first to look at changes in both 
UI benefits receipt and UI eligibility using a nationally representative longitudinal sample 
of low-educated, single mothers at the point that they entered a spell of unemployment 
during 1990-2005. This period includes the 1996 welfare reform, the major EITC 
expansions, two recessions, and two economic expansions of varying sizes. This study 
                                                 
2
 A single mother who received cash assistance in the early 1990s may have never received benefits in the 
post-reform era. On the other hand, the same woman who left welfare post-reform may have never left 
during the early 1990s. 
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frame is used to allow comparison of a pre-reform period (1990-94) and post-reform 
period (2001-5) that are roughly comparable. Both included a mild recession and some 
expansionary years. The study frame does not allow for the evaluations of UI eligibility 
reforms included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (see footnote 
1). Adequate data are not yet available to allow this. The authors also believe that this is 
the first study to examine changes in UI use relative to those in two major income support 
programs: cash welfare (AFDC and TANF), and the FSP. 
Two hypotheses guide this study. First, single mothers entering a spell of 
unemployment in the post-welfare reform period are hypothesized to experience relative 
increases in eligibility for and receipt of UI benefits over mothers entering a spell before 
welfare reform. These increases should be spurred by increasing labor force participation 
and declining access to cash welfare (Holzer 2000; Isaacs 2005). Second, declines in cash 
assistance since welfare reform are hypothesized to diminish the probability that single, 
unemployed mothers access any safety net program in the post reform period. 
 
4.3 Data and Methods 
This study uses data from the SIPP. Collected by the U.S. Census Bureau, SIPP 
data offer a longitudinal representation of the civilian non-institutionalized population 
in the United States. The survey selects a nationally-representative sample by clustering 
addresses within cities and counties. Clustering is based on population counts from the 
most recent decennial census. Interviews are conducted every four months and gather 
data about each individual in the interview subject’s household for each intervening 
month. These data include information on demographics, income sources, public 
assistance program participation, household and family structure, jobs, and work history 
(Westat and Mathematica Policy Research 2001). A recent analysis compares eight major 
nationally representative surveys that measure income and program participation. The 
results suggest that the SIPP does a superior job of measuring the income of low-income 
households and public program participation (Czajka & Denmead, 2008).
3
 
                                                 
3
 Despite the SIPP’s relative strength in measuring program participation, Meyer et al. (2009) find that the 
survey still suffers from under-reporting of public program benefits receipt and the amount of benefits. 
While this presents a limitation to our work, we believe that it highlights one of the strengths of relying on 
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The current analyses pool data from the 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, and 
2004 SIPP panels to create a sample that provides data from the start of 1990 through the 
end of 2005. These data include short gaps in 1995 and 2000 (between SIPP panels). The 
1990-93 panels were typically 2 years long and overlap. Later panels were 3-4 years long, 
and do not overlap. All analyses use person-month weights. Standard errors are clustered 
to account for the use of multiple observations for each respondent. A few small states 
are not uniquely identifiable in the 2001 and older panels. As is common with SIPP 
studies, the current analyses drop observations from these states, because respondents 
cannot be matched with state program eligibility rules (Gruber and Simon 2008). 
The study population is single mothers, age 22-55, who reside with minor 
children and have a high school degree or less education at the time of survey.
4
 The 
comparison group is composed of similarly-educated, single, childless women in the 
same age range. Most analyses compare the relative outcomes of these two groups across 
time. This makes sense because the two populations experience similar dynamic in the 
labor market but are differentially affected by welfare reform and other policy changes. 
The comparison of low-educated, single mothers with low-educated, single, childless 
women may enable these analyses to control for external factors that lead to changes in 
program participation and eligibility but that are not unique to single mothers (Eissa and 
Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Meyer and Sullivan 2004). 
Identifying Job Separations in the SIPP 
Most analyses in this paper examine workers at the point when they enter a spell 
of unemployment. A respondent is considered to enter such a spell if she is employed and 
working during month t-1 and is not working but seeking work in month t. A respondent 
is considered to transition out of the labor force if she works in month t-1 but is not 
working and not seeking work in month t. (The guidelines are adapted from official 
definitions used by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics n.d.). These categorizations are 
fairly stable during the months after job loss. If these restrictions are imposed, the current 
sample includes 48,566 person-year observations of low-educated, single women (22,717 
                                                                                                                                                 
a comparison population, as it is unlikely that rates of under-reporting for single mothers and single 
childless women differ systematically over time. 
4
 We take marital status and education at time t, the point at which they enter a spell of unemployment. We 
explore the importance of a recent marital separation in the sensitivity analysis section. 
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single mothers and 25,849 single, childless women). There are 4,411 person-month 
observations in which low-educated, single women go from working in t-1 to not 
working but seeking work in month t (2,316 single mothers and 2,095 single, childless 
women).
5
 Some of these 4,411 observations may represent respondents who experience 
multiple transitions during a panel. 
Table 1 compares demographic attributes for low-educated, single mothers with 
those for low-educated, single, childless women. The table displays reported 
characteristics for two periods: the pre-reform years (1990-1994) and the post-reform 
years (2001-5). In the post reform period, single mothers are less likely to be black than 
in the pre reform period, and single, childless women in the post reform period are more 
likely to be nonwhite than in the pre reform period. Single mothers in the post reform 
period are also more likely to be high school graduates than in the pre reform period. 
Thus, race and education will be important control variables in multivariate analyses. 
Between the pre- and post-reform periods, reported employment among single, childless 
women declined by 6.1 percentage points, but it increased among single mothers by 12.0 
percentage points. Thus, the difference in rates of labor force participation between the 
two groups changed by 18.1 percentage points from the pre reform period to the post 
reform period. 
Estimating UI Participation and Eligibility 
Participation in UI. A respondent is considered to participate in UI if she reported 
receiving a cash benefit from a state UI program during the first 3 months after a job 
separation (the authors explored the use of 2-, 4-, and 5- month lagged variables, but none 
substantively changes the results). This 3-month lagged variable is necessary because 
considerable time can elapse between job loss and benefits receipt. Workers may be laid 
off and waiting to be called back, or they may explore other employment options before 
turning to UI. Also, many state programs impose a 1-week waiting period on workers 
after eligibility determination. 
Monetary eligibility. The SIPP includes monthly data on earnings. To measure 
monetary eligibility requirements for each state and year in these data, the study draws on 
                                                 
5
 For some analyses of transitions across months in the SIPP, there would be concern that imputation might 
lead to a false transition. However, labor market variables in the SIPP are imputed by taking the 
respondent’s previous month’s values, so in this case imputation would not cause such a transition. 
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annual comparisons of state program laws. These comparisons are provided by the U.S. 
Department of Labor, and merged with the SIPP data for each state by year (U.S. 
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration n.d.). To estimate 
monetary eligibility, each worker’s wages are run through a simulation that compares her 
earnings over one year with her state’s minimum base period and high quarter (if 
applicable) requirements for that year. The three months directly preceding the 
employment separation were omitted so that the analyzed period mirrors the period that 
states would typically exclude in assessing UI eligibility (if it were assessed) before 
adoption of alternative base periods. Although this 3-month period does not coincide 
exactly with the worker’s official base period, it is a close approximation. The analyses 
therefore include data on earnings from work for the 15 months before the employment 
separation but use data for only 12 of those months. To estimate monetary eligibility, the 
analysis is restricted to workers in the sample for five or more months before 
employment separation
6
. A worker is considered to meet her state’s monetary 
requirements if her earnings in the simulated based period and high-quarter earnings were 
at or above her state’s minimum requirements.  
Non-monetary eligibility. Initial non-monetary eligibility requirements related to 
employment separations also vary by state, but they are often generalized in studies of 
nationally representative microdata (Levine 2006; Shaefer 2010). For this study, a 
respondent is considered to meet initial non-monetary requirements if the unemployment 
spell begins because the worker “lost a job or was laid off” (Levine 2006, 375). The 
respondent is considered ineligible if she leaves a position because of a voluntary quit or 
is discharged for misconduct or other performance issues. Because of difficulties with the 
time frame (person-month observations), responses on this measure are available for only 
2,850 out of 4,411 transition observations. To ensure that this does not bias the results, all 
descriptive and regression estimates are run in analyses restricted to this smaller sub-
sample. These results prove substantively similar. Another concern is that some 
respondents may choose not to self-report discharge or performance issues. This means 
                                                 
6
 This may lead to an upward bias in eligibility due to nonrandom attrition (workers who are most likely not 
to meet these requirements may be most likely to leave the SIPP sample early). However, this bias is likely 
similar for mothers and childless women within panels, so it should not strongly affect relative 
comparisons.  
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that estimates from the SIPP may somewhat overestimate non-monetary eligibility. 
However, many of those who are discharged are likely to report a voluntary quit instead. 
If so, the respondent would still be coded as non-monetarily ineligible. Thus, the bias is 
likely small.  
An important limitation of this method is that it will code as ineligible some 
workers who meet some state provisions that allow voluntary job separations for good-
cause reasons (discussed above). Unfortunately, the complexity of state rules makes it is 
impossible to account adequately for this in nationally representative estimates using 
survey microdata (Levine 2006; Shaefer 2010). 
To facilitate interpretation, the analyses in both descriptive and multivariate 
models cluster the years into three period dummy variables: pre-reform (1990-1994), 
reform implementation (1996-1999), and post-reform (2001-5). The years 1995 and 2000 
are omitted from all analyses because of breaks in the SIPP panels. Clustering the 
analyses into three periods does not substantively change the findings. The pre-reform 
(1990-94) and post-reform (2001-5) periods provide particularly useful comparison 
periods, as both included a mild recession and some expansionary years. The reform 
implementation period (1996-99) is quite anomalous because it occurred during an 
economic boom, and states implemented TANF programs at different times after the 
1996 reform. Thus, the analyses focus on comparing outcomes in the pre-reform period 
with those in the post-reform period. 
Multivariate Method 
The multivariate analyses use an approach that is similar to the one employed by 
Bruce Meyer and Dan Rosenbaum (2001) and Meyer and Sullivan (2004). The sample is 
restricted to low-educated, single mothers and low-educated, single, childless women in 
the same age range (22-55). The relative outcomes of these two groups are compared 
because the women in these groups face similar conditions in the labor market. The 
baseline specification is: 

UIi, j, t  n  Xi, j, t periodi, j, t  (singlemotheri, j, t* periodi, j, t)i, j, t  
The dependent variables, UI, in most model are dichotomous outcomes for receipt 
of or eligibility for UI benefits; X is a vector of individual and environmental 
characteristics taken at time t. The period term includes three dummies variables 
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indicating whether the observations belong to the pre reform, reform implementation, or 
post reform period. The term single mother × period interacts single motherhood with the 
period dummies.  
Receipt of UI is coded as 1 if individual i in state j reports UI benefits in month t 
(the month of job separation), t+1 (the month after month t), or t+2 (the second month 
after month t); no UI receipt is coded as 0. Eligibility for UI (both monetary and non-
monetary) is estimated for respondents only in month t. As to independent variables, X 
include race (white, black, other), ethnicity (Hispanic origin =1; otherwise 0), age (in 
dummy categories for ages 22-30, 31-40, 41-50, or 51-55), marital status (never married, 
divorced, separated, or widowed), whether the respondent lives in a metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau), education (high school 
graduate=1; 0 otherwise), the state-month unemployment rate (drawn from publicly 
available tables prepared by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics n.d.), and state fixed 
effects.
7
  
Each model includes a series of terms that measure single motherhood’s 
interactions with period dummy variables. The interaction terms represent the relative 
difference in the probability of the outcome between the comparison group (low-educated, 
single, childless women) and the treatment group (low-educated, single mothers). The 
estimated effect size, calculated by subtracting the point estimate for the post-reform term 
(single mother ×post-reform) from the point estimate for the pre-reform term (single 
mother × pre-reform), shows the relative change in outcome between the two periods. 
The statistical significance of the difference between these point estimates is tested with 
linear restrictions. The p-values for these tests are reported for all models. 
Linear probability (LP) models are used because the interpretation of interactions 
is straightforward. In contrast, the “interaction effect in nonlinear models [probit or logit 
models] does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term, can be of opposite 
sign, and its statistical significance is not calculated by standard software” (Ai and 
Norton 2003, 123). Thus, even if probit or logit specifications are generally preferable for 
                                                 
7
 In sensitivity analyses we run alternative models that account for a recent divorce or separation, long-term 
labor force attachment, industry, household headship. We run models using region fixed effects rather than 
state. We also run models 1) restricting our models to job losers and 2) broadening our models to all 
respondents who go from working to not working. While some of these do change the point estimates 
slightly, they do not change our interpretation of the results. 
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models with dichotomous outcomes, a linear probability approach is more appropriate 
here. 
 
4.4 Results 
Descriptive results  
Table 2 compares UI participation and eligibility outcomes for low-educated, 
single mothers with those for low-educated, single, childless women. The proportion of 
low-educated, single mothers (column 1) and single, childless women (column 2) who 
enter a spell of unemployment and access UI cash benefits are reported by period. 
Column 3 reports the differences between these two groups for each outcome and period 
(column 1 – column 2), associated standard errors are shown in parentheses.8 
The proportion of single mothers entering a spell of unemployment and reporting 
UI receipt fell over the three time periods: from 28.8 percent in the pre reform years 
(1990-94) to 21.4 percent in the post reform years (2001-5). Single, childless women 
report a similar drop in UI receipt (from 31.4 to 25.9 percent), so the difference in 
outcomes between the two groups remains virtually the same across the three time 
periods, changing by a statistically non-significant 1.9 percentage points from the pre 
reform period to the post reform period. Contrary to the hypothesis, these estimates 
suggest that single mothers experiencing a spell of unemployment did not improve their 
relative probability of accessing UI benefits upon entering that spell. 
Table 2 next reports on monetary eligibility rates for single mothers and single, 
childless women over the three study periods.
9
 Over the three periods, rates of monetary 
eligibility improve among single mothers. Among sampled single mothers, 72.6 percent 
are estimated to reach monetary eligibility during the pre reform period, and 76.9 percent 
are eligible during the post reform period. The monetary eligibility rates of single, 
childless women are estimated to go from 86.1 percent in the pre reform period to 83.6 
percent in the post reform period. Therefore, the change in the relative probability of 
meeting monetary eligibility requirements from the pre reform period to the post reform 
                                                 
8
 Standard errors of the differences use the form for standard errors for the difference between two large 
and independent random samples, which generates wider standard errors than some alternative measures. 
9
 Our estimates of both monetary and non-monetary eligibility are quite similar to existing estimates for 
similar although not identical populations and study periods (Kaye, 1997; Rangarajan & Razaﬁndrakoto, 
2004; Rangarajan et al., 2002). 
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period is estimated to be larger (in increase of 4.3 percentage points) among single 
mothers than among single, childless women (whose probability declines by 2.5 
percentage points), and the difference in the change for the two groups is a statistically 
significant (at p<.10) 6.8 percentage points. 
 The table next tracks non-monetary eligibility across the three time periods. As 
expected, rates of non-monetary eligibility are far lower than rates of monetary eligibility 
across both groups of low-educated single women. Among the sampled single mothers, 
40.2 percent are estimated to be non-monetarily eligible during the pre-reform period, 
and 38.7 percent apparently meet these requirements in the post-reform period. By 
contrast, the rate of non-monetary eligibility is estimated to drop by 9.7 percentage points 
among their single, childless counterparts (from 46.1 to 36.4 percent being non-
monetarily eligible). The change between the pre- and post-reform period in the 
probability of meeting non-monetary eligibility requirements is estimated to be smaller 
among single mothers (a decline of 1.5 points) than among single, childless women (a 
statistically significant decline of 9.7 points), and the difference in the change between 
the two groups is estimated to be a statistically significant 8.2 percentage points. Thus, in 
terms of both monetary and non-monetary eligibility, eligibility rates among single 
mothers improved relative to those among single, childless women. Specifically, single 
mothers are estimated to have greater gains in monetary eligibility, and although non-
monetary eligibility is estimated to decline for both groups, the decline is smaller among 
single mothers. 
 Table 2 next reports on the proportion of sampled single mothers and single, 
childless women who access cash welfare (AFDC or TANF) or the FSP, upon entering a 
spell of unemployment. As would be expected, the proportion of single mothers 
accessing these programs is higher in all periods than the proportion of single, childless 
women accessing them. As would further be expected, the proportion of single mothers 
accessing cash welfare drops considerably, from 30.8 to 14.8 percent. However, the 
proportion accessing the FSP stays relatively constant across the study period, going from 
53.6 percent in the pre reform period to 54.2 percent in the post reform period. Patterns of 
use of these programs will be discussed in more detail later on.  
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 Finally, table 2 reports the mean UI benefit amount received by sampled single 
mothers who received UI benefits (amounts adjusted to 1996 dollars). From the pre 
reform to the post reform period, benefit amounts remain relatively stable for single 
mothers; they report receiving $504 in the pre reform period and $503 in the post reform 
period. Single, childless women who received any UI benefits reportedly received a 
statistically significant increase between these two periods, from $501 to $639. Thus, the 
change in single mothers’ benefit amounts (an average decline of $1) is estimated to be 
less than the change in benefits received by single, childless women (an average increase 
of $138), and the relative difference (a decline of $139) is substantial and statistically 
significant. From the pre reform period to the post reform period, single mothers 
accessing UI appear to lose ground to single, childless women in terms of the benefits 
received.  
Multivariate Results 
 Table 3 reports results from a series of regression models that test the descriptive 
relations discussed above. Note that the terms for the interaction between single 
motherhood and the time period represent the estimated relative difference between 
single mothers and single, childless women in each period. These estimates control for 
other factors included in the models. The effect of interest is the difference between the 
point estimates for the pre-reform (single mother × pre-reform) and post-reform (single 
mother × post-reform) interaction terms. The test of linear restrictions determines 
whether these point estimates are statistically significantly different from each other.  
 The estimated relations involving other covariates are consistent with findings 
from previous studies. Results suggest that older workers are more likely to obtain UI 
benefits and to meet both monetary and non-monetary eligibility requirements than are 
younger workers. High school graduates are estimated to be more likely to obtain benefits 
and to be monetarily eligible than are those without a high school degree. Compared with 
non-union workers, union members are 8.1 percentage points more likely to obtain 
benefits and 5.5 percentage points more likely to be monetarily eligible. Very few of the 
racial and ethnic point estimates are statistically significant. Blacks were 6.4 percentage 
points less likely than their white counterparts to meet monetary eligibility requirements 
but no less likely to report receiving UI benefits. Hispanic respondents are estimated to 
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be 8.3 percentage points more likely to be non-monetarily eligible than are their non-
Hispanic counterparts. 
Table 3’s first column reports results from a model predicting respondents’ 
receipt of UI benefits. Results from the three interactions suggest that single mothers do 
not differ to a statistically significant degree from single, childless women on receipt of 
UI benefits during the pre reform, reform implementation, and post reform periods. 
Moreover, none of the interaction terms is statistically significantly different from 
another. These results support the descriptive finding that single mothers experiencing a 
spell of unemployment do not improve their probability of obtaining UI benefits in 2001-
5 relative to the probability for single, childless women. 
The table also reports results from models with dichotomous outcomes for 
monetary eligibility and non-monetary eligibility. Estimates for the pre reform period 
suggest that single mothers are 11.6 percentage points less likely than similar childless 
women to meet monetary eligibility requirements (the difference between groups is 
statistically significant), but mothers in the post reform period are estimated to be 4.0 
percentage points less likely than their counterparts to meet those requirements, and the 
difference is not statistically significant. The estimated change in monetary eligibility 
from one period to the other represents a relative improvement of 7.6 percentage points, 
and the difference is statistically significant at the p<.05 level. Results from the monetary 
eligibility model control for other measured factors and are consistent with the 
descriptive findings that the rates of monetary eligibility improved among single mothers 
relative to single, childless women. 
Non-monetary eligibility results from the pre reform period suggest that single 
mothers are .032 percentage points less likely to meet these criteria than are single, 
childless women, but single mothers are 5.9 percentage points more likely to meet the 
non-monetary requirements in the post reform period. Although the parameter estimates 
are not statistically significant, the test of linear restrictions for these terms yields a 
statistically significant p-value of .063. These findings support the conclusion that, 
relative to non-monetary eligibility rates of single, childless women, those of single 
mothers improved from the pre- to the post-reform period. Finally, in the model that 
examines the amount of UI benefits received (if any), sampled single mothers go from 
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receiving $29.50 more than single, childless women in the pre reform period to $93.95 
less in the post reform period. While these point estimates are not significant, the 
difference between them is significant at the p<.10 level. 
Changing participation in other public programs over time 
Two other forms of support that low-educated, single mothers may access when 
entering a spell of unemployment are cash welfare and the FSP. Cash welfare was the 
primary target of the 1996 welfare reform, so the major changes leading to declines in 
cash assistance (AFDC and TANF) caseloads affected low-educated, single mother 
particularly. With a caseload of 25.7 million individuals in 2005, the FSP served more 
individuals than TANF (4.5 million), UI (7.9 million) and even the EITC (22.8 million; 
Scholz, Moffitt, and Cowen 2009). 
 Figure 1 plots the annual rates at which these programs’ benefits are received by 
low-educated, single mothers entering a spell of unemployment. Between 1990 and 1993, 
the rates at which single mothers entering a spell of unemployment received UI benefits 
were nearly identical to those at which they received AFDC benefits. Rates of AFDC 
receipt peaked in 1994 for sampled single mothers, and participation in cash assistance 
declined over the next decade.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, the rate of UI benefits receipt among sampled single 
mothers also dropped during the reform implementation years (1996-99). This is to be 
expected for two reasons. First, employment separations during economic expansions are 
more often a result of voluntary quits or discharge than during economic contractions. 
Thus, the proportion of the unemployed who are eligible for UI benefits typically goes 
down during expansions. Second, during expansions, workers are more likely to return to 
employment without accessing UI because of a greater availability of jobs. As the 
economy entered the 2001 recession, however, the rate of UI receipt eclipsed that for 
cash welfare receipt. In 2002, for example, 15.7 percent of sampled single mothers 
received TANF benefits, but 21.4 percent received UI benefits. Since 2002, the 
percentage of single mothers receiving TANF has shrunk even further, but the percentage 
receiving UI stayed above the proportion receiving cash welfare in every year.  
As the figure suggests, receipt of FSP benefits is far more common than receipt of 
either UI or cash welfare. Receipt of food stamps grew in the early 1990s, declined 
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during the reform implementation period (1996-99), and then rose substantially during 
the post reform period. In 2001, 51 percent of sampled single mothers reported receiving 
food stamps, and 64 percent did so in 2005. 
 Column 5 of table 3 examines the probability that sampled respondents receive 
benefits from one or more of these three programs during the study period. In results 
from multivariate analyses that control for other measured factors, during both the pre 
reform and the post reform periods, the probability that a single mother will be served by 
at least one of these programs is estimated to be approximately 25 percentage points 
higher than the probability that a single childless women will be served by at least one of 
these programs. This is despite the precipitous decline in the probability of receiving cash 
assistance. Across all three periods, sampled single mothers seem to benefit from an extra 
layer of safety net protection in the form of cash assistance and FSP benefits. The results 
suggest that they benefit more from this than do sampled, single, childless women.  
 
4.5 Sensitivity Analyses 
A series of alternative models were estimated to assess the robustness of the 
multivariate findings. All results are available from the authors upon request. Models 
added (potentially endogenous) industry variables because the industry in which an 
individual works has a strong effect on her UI eligibility and the probability that she will 
receive benefits. Results from estimates of the interaction between single motherhood and 
the time period point estimates are quite similar in these models. This may reflect that 
single mothers and single, childless women are clustered in the same industries. Models 
also were restricted to household heads because single mothers who cohabit with partners 
may have access to resources not enjoyed by household heads. The results also are 
substantively similar. Other models accounted for a recent marital status change and 
long-term labor force attachment. The results remain substantively similar. In models 
restricted to long-term workers, the results on non-monetary eligibility move in the same 
direction but become statistically insignificant. 
Still other models assessed the importance of changing patterns of re-
employment; perhaps single mothers in the post-reform period are likely to go back to 
work faster than single, childless women in that period. There is some evidence that 
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single mothers increase their likelihood of returning to employment relative to single, 
childless women from the pre reform to the post reform period. This may have an impact 
on the probability of UI receipt during a spell of unemployment. Additional models were 
run restricted to the population of involuntary job losers (who, by definition, meet non-
monetary eligibility requirements) and restricted to a sample of single women who 
transitioned from work to not working. This sample is broader than the one employed in 
the main models and includes women who may not be seeking work (seeking work is a 
prerequisite of accessing UI). These alternative samples led to some changes in the point 
estimates for the key interaction terms, but the relative changes between periods are 
substantively similar to those in the main model estimates. Among involuntary job losers, 
the change in monetary eligibility between sampled single mothers and single, childless 
women between the pre reform and post reform period becomes smaller and statistically 
insignificant but moves in the same direction as the results in table 3. 
 
4.6 Discussion 
 The analyses have a number of limitations. Underreporting of benefits is a 
concern in household surveys (Meyer et al. 2009). The SIPP generally achieves higher 
reporting rates than similar household surveys, but because underreporting rates in a 
single survey can vary across years and especially panels, reporting problems complicate 
comparisons of annual participation rates. Also, changes in UI participation over time 
may be tied to certain other factors (e.g., broad labor market changes) and may not be 
related to the social policy changes experienced by single mothers. These concerns 
highlight the advantages of focusing on relative comparisons of low-educated, single 
mothers to low-educated, single, childless women over time. Such comparisons may 
mitigate concerns about under-reporting. 
As with all studies that use household survey microdata, this study is limited in its 
ability to accurately model monetary and non-monetary eligibility. However, the 
empirical benefit of using data from a household survey such as the SIPP, even when 
doing so requires making some assumptions, is that these data enable one to examine a 
nationally representative population over a long period. Currently, such an examination is 
not possible if one uses administrative data. Also, few (if any) sources of administrative 
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data include information on family composition or education level, key variables in the 
current study (Levine, 2006). The current estimates of monetary and non-monetary 
eligibility are consistent with other studies that use other data sources to examine similar 
populations (Rangarajan et al. 2002; Rangarajan & Razaﬁndrakoto 2004). 
Despite such limitations, this article offers a number of findings that could be 
useful in examining policy. The study finds that, across the study period, there is no 
increase in the rate of UI benefits receipt for single mothers relative to that for single, 
childless women, even though the rate of eligibility in the post reform period among 
single mothers improves in comparison to their single, childless counterparts from the pre 
reform to the post reform period. Further research should pursue this further; if rates of 
eligibility have improved, why has receipt not? The results suggest that, because receipt 
of cash assistance declined, however, UI is now a more common income support than 
cash assistance for low-educated, single mothers who enter unemployment. 
Although the importance of cash welfare diminished over the study period, the 
FSP has grown in importance. Roughly three-fifths of low-educated, single mothers 
entering a spell of unemployment used FSP benefits in 2004-5. Upon entering a spell of 
unemployment, most low-educated, single mothers use at least one of the three programs 
studied here, and they are far more likely to get some form of aid than similarly educated 
single, childless women. One possible explanation for why UI receipt did not improve is 
that eligibility for FSP reduces the motivation to apply for UI, especially when 
individuals may be uncertain of their eligibility for UI.  
Some recent policy efforts to boost the UI participation rates of vulnerable 
workers focus on reforming UI eligibility rules. The current results lead to the conclusion 
that reforming eligibility requirements may not, in and of itself, substantively increase 
benefits receipt. Although rates of both monetary and non-monetary eligibility improved 
for single mothers relative to those for single, childless women, single mothers see no 
relative improvement in the rate of benefits receipt. This may be due to a lack of 
knowledge about the program, a lack of understanding of a complex bureaucratic process, 
a lack of need for benefits (as a result of expanded access to the FSP), or a quick 
transition back to work. Future research should explore these possibilities. A few studies 
find that individuals fail to apply for UI mainly because they believe that they are 
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ineligible (Wandner and Stettner 2000; Vroman 2009). If this is the case, a public 
information campaign may be needed to raise awareness of possible eligibility in order to 
increase take-up rates of eligible low-educated workers. 
To the extent that eligibility criteria act as a barrier to UI receipt for this 
population, non-monetary requirements seem to be a greater barrier than monetary 
requirements. However, reforming non-monetary requirements involves issues of moral 
hazard; making UI benefits available to individuals who quit their job would provide 
incentives to do so. Some might argue that low rates of non-monetary eligibility result 
from personal characteristics of low-educated, single working mothers, who may not 
have the skills necessary to maintain employment. If this were accurate, the best way to 
increase UI receipt would be to strengthen job training programs for low-skilled workers. 
Because low-educated, single mothers access UI benefits at rates that are comparable to 
low-educated, single, childless women, such a campaign might benefit all low-educated 
workers. 
Two things call this individual-level interpretation into question, though. First, the 
historical purpose of UI monetary eligibility rates has been to determine whether a 
worker has sufficient labor force attachment to merit access to UI benefits. As the current 
study suggests, most working, single mothers who fall into unemployment meet these 
thresholds and, thus, have substantial attachment to the labor force. Second, low levels of 
non-monetary eligibility are highly associated with the industries in which single mothers 
are clustered (U.S. General Accounting Office 2000). These industries avoid formal lay-
offs, utilizing changes in work hours and other methods that can often cause a worker to 
quit (Lambert 2008). 
Thus, policymakers are left with a dilemma. Liberalizing non-monetary eligibility 
limits may weaken the UI system by marginalizing its status as social insurance. By not 
liberalizing, however, policy makers may leave low-educated workers with substantial 
labor force attachment out of the UI system. How might policy makers begin to address 
this? A first step would be to examine the non-monetary eligibility rules of U.S. states 
with more liberal non-monetary eligibility requirements. The requirements of other 
Western industrial nations might also be examined, many of which limit non-monetary 
ineligibility to a few weeks or months instead of the unemployment spell duration (Storey 
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and Neisner 1997). Although the optimal policy prescriptions may not be clear at this 
point in time, policymakers must consider how these requirements might be re-shaped if 
UI is to serve as effective social insurance for low-educated workers with substantial 
labor force attachment in the twenty-first Century. 
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Figure 4.1: Program Participation of Single Mothers Entering into Unemployment 
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of Low-educated, Single Women Ages 22-55 (Pre- and Post-
Reform) 
 Single Mothers Single Childless Women 
  
Pre-Reform 
(1990-94) 
Post-Reform 
(2001-5) 
Pre-Reform 
(1990-94) 
Post-Reform 
(2001-5) 
Race and Ethnicity     
White .609 .636 .762 .721 
Black .361 .312 .214 .229 
Other race .030 .052 .025 .050 
Hispanic Origin .177 .156 .115 .112 
Age 33.5 34.4 38.8 40.4 
Employed .510 .630 .700 .639 
Education:     
Less than high school 
degree .382 .328 .286 .265 
High school graduate .618 .672 .714 .735 
N 9,358 7,000 10,793 8,037 
Source: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation.  
Note:  Results are means. All estimates are weighted.     
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Table 4.2: Public Program Participation and Eligibility of Low-Educated, Single Women 
Entering Unemployment, Ages 22-55 
 Mothers Childless Women Difference 
 (1) (2) (1-2) 
UI Participation:     
    Pre-reform period .288 
(.018) 
.314 
(.018) 
-.026 
(.025) 
    Reform period  .173* 
(.017) 
.210* 
(.020) 
-.037 
(.026) 
    Post-reform period  .214* 
(.018) 
.259* 
(.020) 
-.045 
(.027) 
Monetary Eligibility for UI:    
    Pre-reform period  .726 
(.021) 
.861 
(.014) 
-.137 
(.025) 
    Reform period  .744 
(.022) 
.865 
(.020) 
-.121 
(.030) 
    Post-reform period  .769* 
(.019) 
.836 
(.020) 
-.067
+
 
(.028) 
Non-monetary Eligibility for UI:    
    Pre-reform period  .402 
(.025) 
.461 
(.025) 
-.059 
(.035) 
    Reform period .346 
(.025) 
.348* 
(.030) 
-.002 
(.039) 
    Post-reform period .387 
(.023) 
.364* 
(.028) 
.023
+
 
(.036) 
Cash welfare participation:    
   Pre-reform period .308 
(.019) 
.039 
(.007) 
.269 
(.020) 
   Reform Period .251* 
(.021) 
.045 
(.009) 
.206* 
(.023) 
   Post-reform period .148* 
(.014) 
.035 
(.008) 
.113* 
(.016) 
FSP participation:     
   Pre reform period .536 
(.021) 
.137 
(.013) 
.399 
(.025) 
   Reform Period .521 
(.024) 
.152 
(.018) 
.369 
(.030) 
   Post-reform period .542 
(.021) 
.169 
(.017) 
.373 
(.027) 
UI benefits, if any, received (1996$):    
   Pre-reform period 504 
(23) 
501 
(18) 
3 
(29) 
   Reform period 451 
(27) 
468 
(33) 
-17 
(43) 
   Post-reform period 503 
(29) 
639* 
(49) 
-136* 
(57) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the 1990-2004 panels of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation.  
Note: UI=unemployment insurance; cash welfare = Aid to Families with Dependent Children or Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families; FSP= Food Stamp Program (now Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program); pre-reform period= 1990-94; reform period= 1996-99; post-reform period = 2001-5. Standard 
errors are presented in parentheses and clustered by respondent. All estimates are weighted.  
+ Statistically significantly different from same-column estimate for 1990-94 by .10 level.  
*Statistically significantly different from same-column estimate for 1990-94 by .05 level or above.  
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Table 4.3: OLS Models: Public Program Participation and Eligibility of Low-educated, 
Single Women, Ages 22-55 
 UI Receipt Monetary 
Eligibility 
Non-
monetary 
Eligibility 
UI Amount, if 
received 
Participation 
UI, TANF, or 
FSP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Single mother × pre-
reform -0.00382 -0.116** -0.0317 29.50 0.250** 
(1990-94) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0346) (31.03) (0.0270) 
Single mother × reform 0.0172 -0.0837** 0.0496 11.00 0.286** 
(1996-99) (0.0263) (0.0298) (0.0389) (44.75) (0.0329) 
Single mother × post-
reform -0.0120 -0.0396 0.0592 -93.95 0.246** 
(2001-5) (0.0269) (0.0282) (0.0368) (60.27) (0.0308) 
P-value from tests of linear restriction: Ho: single mother ×pre – single mother ×post =0 
 .818 .035* .063
+
 .053
+
 .921 
Other Variables      
Age      
   22-30 (reference) --- --- --- --- --- 
   31-40 0.111** 0.0660** 0.0466
+
 48.04 0.0401
+
 
 (0.0189) (0.0203) (0.0261) (30.98) (0.0207) 
   41-50 0.127** 0.0823** 0.0878** 70.87
+
 0.0577* 
 (0.0245) (0.0229) (0.0317) (37.57) (0.0269) 
   51-55 0.200** 0.0775** 0.227** 6.737 0.105** 
 (0.0382) (0.0300) (0.0509) (51.23) (0.0402) 
Race      
   White --- --- --- --- --- 
   Black 0.00681 -0.0644** -0.00455 -64.53
+
 0.188** 
 (0.0187) (0.0205) (0.0268) (37.50) (0.0218) 
   Other 0.00284 -0.0286 0.0708 -20.20 0.0284 
 (0.0465) (0.0415) (0.0562) (48.67) (0.0488) 
   Hispanic origin 0.0326 0.0139 0.0827* 11.59 0.0276 
 (0.0263) (0.0258) (0.0378) (32.50) (0.0288) 
   High school graduate 0.0520** 0.0634** -0.0129 22.97 -0.0371* 
 (0.0169) (0.0175) (0.0224) (24.35) (0.0184) 
Marital Status      
   Never married 
(reference) 
---  --- --- --- 
   Widowed -0.0112 -0.00695 0.0585 -79.95 -0.0732 
 (0.0444) (0.0393) (0.0578) (52.14) (0.0477) 
   Divorced 0.0233 0.0298 0.00149 -.291 -0.000720 
 (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0276) (27.76) (0.0220) 
   Separated -0.0279 -0.0391 -0.0186 -30.05 0.0123 
 (0.0245) (0.0272) (0.0336) (35.22) (0.0275) 
MSA resident -0.0546* 0.0311 -0.0136 62.93* -0.0583* 
 (0.0220) (0.0232) (0.0295) (26.78) (0.0233) 
Current student -0.0482 -0.0397 -0.0731 5.996 0.00215 
 (0.0298) (0.0394) (0.0468) (62.07) (0.0347) 
Union member 0.0814* 0.0546
+
 0.0480 48.47 0.0918* 
 (0.0399) (0.0321) (0.0467) (41.48) (0.0376) 
State-month 
unemployment 0.0205* 0.00391 0.0152 -15.05 0.0262** 
rate (0.00873) (0.00907) (0.0119) (12.85) (0.00919) 
Time Period      
   Pre-reform period ---  --- --- --- 
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   Reform period -0.0685* 0.0100 -0.0801
+
 -75.58
+
 -0.0398 
 (0.0325) (0.0317) (0.0440) (45.38) (0.0355) 
   Post-reform period -0.0343 -0.0217 -0.0848* 112.5* -0.00693 
 (0.0293) (0.0282) (0.0388) (49.50) (0.0323) 
Observations 4,409 3,395 2,850 1,098 4,409 
R-square .09 .07 .07 .09 .13 
Source: Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the 1990-2004 panels of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation. 
Note: UI=unemployment insurance; MSA= metropolitan statistical area. All models include state fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered by respondent.  + p<.10; *p< .05; 
** p<.01 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
  My dissertation is comprised of three separate essays that investigate health 
and welfare issues, both in China and US. The first essay provides insights into the 
net effects of increasing women’s bargaining power on the health outcomes of their 
children. Using Chinese longitudinal data in the 1990s, I find evidence in favor of 
women’s empowerment: children in families where the mother was head of household 
or made more purchasing decision had better Body Mass Index (BMI) than their 
counterparts whose mother had less power. The second essay explores the health 
consequences of computer use in internet cafés compared with usage at home only or 
in both settings. Using Chinese longitudinal data in the mid 2000s, I find suggestive 
evidence that adolescents and youth using computers in internet cafés are more likely 
to smoke and to self-report poor health status, and to consume a higher share of fat in 
their daily diets. The health disparities between computer users in internet cafés and 
other settings are significant. The third essay examines changing levels of 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) eligibility and benefits receipt among low-educated 
single mothers who entered unemployment between 1990 and 2005, and changing 
participation in cash welfare and the Food Stamp Program (FSP). Using the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the study shows that low-educated single 
mothers who enter unemployment experience an increase in UI eligibility but not an 
increase in UI benefits receipt, when compared to low-educated, single, childless 
women who enter unemployment. The proportion of this population accessing 
benefits from at least one of these programs remains similar across the study period. 
 
